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European political cooperation at the United Nations General Assembly in the 1980's.

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EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE 1980'S

A Thesis Presented

by

KLAUS-DIETER STADLER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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
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*Meinen Eltern,
in Liebe und Dankbarkeit*

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PREFACE

This thesis is the product of several personal experiences which include years of study in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the United States and research at the United Nations in New York. All these experiences shaped in different ways my own awareness of the complexity as well as the limits of the study of political science, international relations and their environment.

I have debts of gratitude to the many people, perhaps too many to mention, who in various ways helped me to pursue my studies in the United States and to accomplish this work. My thesis committee (Professors Gerard Braunthal, Eric S. Einhorn and M. J. Peterson of the Department of Political Science, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst) provided me with useful advice and invaluable support during the long process of transforming my first ideas on this subject into the final draft. To all the persons whom I interviewed in New York and Bonn, I would like to express my thanks for their co-operation. My research on the European political co-operation at the United Nations General Assembly in the 1980's would not have been possible without the support of the library staff of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the Lamont Library of Harvard University, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the United Nations. My special

thanks go to Dr. Jürgen Dedring for his advice and support during my research at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

My graduate studies at Amherst would not have been possible without the granting of an exchange scholarship by both the University of Heidelberg and the University of Massachusetts for the academic year of 1985 - 1986. I am grateful for the support I received during my second year at the Graduate School at Amherst through the awarding of a foreign student scholarship by the University of Massachusetts and the Quadrille Ball Fellowship by the Germanistic Society of America. I give special thanks to the staff of the foreign student offices, both in Heidelberg and Amherst.

The responsibility for any thesis' defects rests quite rightly with me alone.

Klaus-Dieter Stadler

NOTE ON CITATIONS

General Assembly records are cited by session, body and meeting. Untile the thirtieth regular session plenary and main committee meetings were numbered consecutively without regard to session. The resolutions of the General Assembly were indentified by an arabic numeral followed by a roman numeral in parantheses indicating the session (for example: resolution 3363 (XXX)). Since the thirty-first session, General Assembly documents, resolutions, decisions and meetings have been numbered consecutively within sessions, each session starting anew. Resolutions have been identified by an arabic numeral, indicating the session, followed by an oblique stroke and another arabic numeral (for example: resolution 31/1, decision 31/301). The first plenary meeting in the 40th session is cited as A/40/PV.1. Main committee meetings add a notation for the commmittee (C.1 through C.6 and SPC for the Special Political Committee).

I N T R O D U C T I O N

NATURE OF PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF STUDY

The European Political Co-operation (EPC) has been an element of Western European integration for more than a decade. It demonstrates the united will of the twelve governments in the European Community (EC) to promote common actions in the field of foreign policy. After co-operation in economic fields had not brought the expected success in political-integration terms, the co-operation in the field of foreign policy should achieve more Western European influence in international relations and enable Europe¹ to "speak with one voice" in world politics. The EPC added a second form of European co-operation to the already existing economic integration process of the European Communities in order to secure an appropriate role for Europe in the future. For the public as well as for non-European political groups, the differences between these two forms of European integration are often irritating and not understandable.

This study deals exclusively with the newer form of European integration: namely the European Political Co-operation (EPC). It analyses the co-operation on political issues between the twelve EC member states in the framework of the EPC at the United Nations General Assembly in the 1980's.

The United Nations (U.N.), and especially the General Assembly, is a natural showcase for observing the co-operation of the European states on all important issues in world politics. The General Assembly (G.A.) can be rightly called the principal body of the United Nations. Because of the universality of its membership, the wide scope of its agenda, its supervisory role in relation to other U.N. organs, its budget-making powers, and the continuing desire, in spite of criticism, of leaders of all countries to attend its sessions, it comes closest to a kind of a world parliament. G.A. decisions determine the policies of the U.N. bodies; focus world attention on some problems and away from others; define for many societies what constitutes a problem; and help shape the context in which the West² must operate with regard to important matters. Consequently votes in the U.N. are often regarded, rightly or wrong, as expressions of world opinion on major issues.

The U.N. provides an example of the structural political tensions between regionalism and universalism. The desire for regional structures in form of groups, as in the case of the European Community or other blocs, has increased since the foundation of the U.N. and blocs are now one of the dominating factors in the world organization. The U.N. also offers the universal stage for the exhibition of political, economic, and social conflicts mainly between industrialized

nations and developing countries. Moreover offers the universal U.N. the "turbulent field", in the words of Ernst Haas, in which regional integration occurs. The co-operation of the Twelve³ is also interesting for political scientists to observe because it characterizes one way of formulating foreign policy in modern world politics: an effort to make joint policy through multilateral co-operation. Furthermore, the EPC is interesting for studies on integration and international organizations. It functions on an intergovernmental basis, coping with a difficult situation of the economic and social integration of the EC, whose stagnation confounds the prediction of automatic "spill over" of the integration process predicted by some of the integration theorists.⁴

This study deals only with one area of the EPC, namely its members' co-operation at the G.A. in the 1980's. Beside the above mentioned theoretical questions others were especially decisive for the choice of this subject, for which no other study for the 1980's exists: The United Nations is a challenge and a problem for the continuing co-operation between the European states and other Western states. They are a small - but economically strong - minority at the G.A. where they are confronted with a majority of Third World countries and their demands for economic and political equality. The European desire for a long-term common foreign policy is confronted continuously by Third World

demands. Thereby the former are being pressed to prove how serious they take their co-operation.

The Southern enlargement of the EC by three Mediterranean states during the 1980's, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal, has naturally affected the policy of the EPC at the U.N., what has to be analyzed.

In this context the study shall examine where the possibilities and limitations of the EPC in New York lie. It has to be examined if and to what degree the EPC is able to work efficiently in the regional European and in the broader Western context.

The position of the United States and its policy in the G.A. during the 1980's is not without influence on the role of the EPC at the U.N., and therefore also has to be discussed briefly.

The differences of competence between the EC, and the EPC, and how it has affected the co-operation of the Twelve has to be analyzed in this context as well.

Research for this study had to surmount several problems, which stemmed mainly from the special character of the EPC as an intergovernmental unit based on direct consultations between the foreign ministers and the foreign ministries of the Twelve. The EPC does not possess a huge bureaucratic apparatus such as the EC maintains, but it is organized through a presidential system - with a six-month

rotating presidency - leaving the main burden to the individual national ministries. The decisive actors in the EPC decision making process co-operate together; therefore no publicly accessible EPC documents, minutes of meetings, papers or other materials exist which could reveal the content and the procedures of EPC co-operation. Only common declarations, press releases and certain reports on EPC process are being publicized.

Similarly public documentation on the co-operation of the Twelve at the U.N. is scanty. Only statements by the presidency on behalf of the Twelve in the G.A. plenary or its committees are available. The voting behavior of the Europeans at the G.A. on individual resolutions can be observed from the official U.N. documents on questions where a roll-call vote is taken. By making statistical tables of the votes cast one can analyze the voting patterns of the Twelve during the 1980's, and thereby the development of EPC could systematically be observed and tendencies analyzed. Even when there is no roll-call vote, the national "explanations of votes" publicized in the "verbatim records" of G.A. meetings give conclusions about differences in the national positions of the Twelve.

These problems, and the nonavailability of documents of the 40th session of the G.A. in the Five College area, made it necessary for the author to conduct most of his research

at the United Nations Headquarter in New York and at the Lamont library of Harvard University in Cambridge. On the basis of interviews with diplomats of most of the twelve EC delegations, the mission of the EC Commission and the U.S. mission at the U.N. in New York (conducted during September and October 1986), as well as of documentary materials in New York and Cambridge, the necessary factual information for the study could be obtained. The major interviews were supplemented by shorter contacts with members of other Western and Third World delegations as well as with officials of the U.N. Secretariat. Finally, interviews were conducted at the Federal Foreign ministry in Bonn with national officials directly involved in the EPC proceedings and in U.N. questions, during July 1986, which complemented the research for this study.

The interviews were conducted in a non-standardized form, the questions were adopted on an ad hoc basis to the specific circumstances of the factual suppositions of the respondents and actual discussions at the G.A. The confidential nature of the interviews does not make it presently possible to specify the names of the officials questioned.

Despite the lack of enough relevant data, the author is convinced that through the available materials, press reports, journal articles, the analysis of the voting behavior of the European states, and interviews in New York

and Bonn, a scholarly analysis of the EPC at the United Nations could be made satisfactorily. Nevertheless many questions can only definitely be answered if all archives are opened for research.

The study is divided into three major parts. The first part, the West in the United Nations, describes the position of the Western states in the U.N., which is characterized by its minority role towards the majority of Third World countries and the role of the EPC in them. This part will also emphasize the position of the United States in the United Nations General Assembly and its impact on the twelve European states. The second part, the EPC Process, describes first the origins, development and goals of the EPC organization of which the co-operation in New York is a part. Then the EPC consultations and instruments at the G.A., the way the EPC acts, and how its co-operation with the EC Commission is working in the U.N. is analyzed. Part three, Possibilities and Limits of EPC, analyzes the overall voting pattern of the EPC Member States, which are characterized by the steady competition between national and European interests. The study also includes the enlargement of the EPC in the 1980's, how the permanent membership of France and the United Kingdom influence the EPC process, and how the twelve EC Member States acted and voted on some of the main political issues in the 40th G.A., including

Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Africa, Central America and the Middle East. The thesis concludes with a summary and the results of the study.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. This study understands by the term "Europe" exclusively Western Europe. It consists of several sovereign states - connected through economic and political co-operation - which have entrusted the common structure of the European Community with certain national powers and rights and who share different feelings of togetherness.

2. By the term "West" the author means the unity of all Western European states, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia which share common political and economic values and which are members or observers of the "Western European and Others Group". As a geographical group it is referred to in certain General Assembly resolutions as being entitled to a specific number of seats or membership (e.g., vice-presidencies of the G.A., number of seats on the Economic and Social Council).

3. The description "the Twelve" is used throughout the study for the original six, then nine, later ten and now twelve Member States of the European Community.

4. Integration theory and regionalism theory have made a fundamental development since their emergence. This is especially the case for the neofunctionalism in the integration theory. The writings of many neofunctionalists focus on the formation and evolution of the European community. Especially Ernst Haas has drawn much of his assumptions about integration from his analysis of the European Community. The central part of Haas's work is the concept of "spill-over". In his view economic issues in a democratic, pluralistic, industrial setting are most likely to spill over into political integration. Because it would extend the content of this thesis by including a discussion on the interdependence between the EPC and different aspects of integration theory - without the intention of completeness - some bibliographical notices: Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958). By examining the process of European integration in the 1960's and 1970's Haas modified his spill-over concept over time. See here especially his articles: "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", *International Organisation*, XV (Autumn 1961); "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, V (June 1967), and "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration", *International Organization*, 30 (1976). Joseph

Nye hypothesized in his seven process mechanism for neofunctionalist theory, for example that imbalances or inherent linkages of tasks in the integration process can be a force for pressing political actors to redefine their common tasks. Thereby a linkage can be caused either in form of a "spill-over" or a "spill-back". See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation*, 30 (1976). See also Karl Deutsch, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York, 1967); Richard Inglehart, "An End to European Integration", *American Political Review*, LXI (March 1967). L.N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963); C.J. Friedrich, *Europe: An Emergent Nation?* (New York, 1969) or Stanley Hoffmann, *Gullivers Troubles or Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1968) and "The Fate of the Nation State", *Daedalus*, VC (Summer 1966). Critic on the integrationist approach to Western Europe is, for example, mentioned by Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, (London, 1973); Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds), *Regional Integration Theory and Research* (Cambridge, 1971); and Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York, 1964).

C H A P T E R I
THE WEST IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Jeane Kirkpatrick, the Reagan Administration's first ambassador to the U.N., emphasized that the importance of decisions of the United Nations are widely interpreted as reflecting "world opinion", and are being endowed "with substantial moral and intellectual force". Even if not dangerous, "UN votes affect both the image and the reality of power in the U.N. system and beyond it", stated Kirkpatrick.¹

Resolutions are either adopted in the form of consensus, which indicates that no vote was taken and a decision was achieved through a process of consensus, or in form of roll-call or recorded votes on controversial issues. For example, the 40th General Assembly adopted a record number (353) of resolutions and decisions, more than half of which (198) were decided without a vote or by consensus. Some 201 issues were decided by vote; in a number of cases votes were held on separate paragraphs as well as on the entire resolutions.

In the 1980's the structural conditions for the Western States in the United Nations and especially in the General Assembly are based mainly on the large majority of Third World countries; and the way decisions and resolutions are

being adopted in the U.N. organs.

In the first years of its existence the United Nations was dominated by the Western States under the leadership of the United States. However, through the process of decolonization, specially in the late 1950's and early 1960's, this major feature of the United Nations was totally changed. Of the 159 member-states at the 40th General Assembly in 1986 were 124 of the Third World. Therefore the image of the U.N. at present is dominated by this large majority of Third World countries in the General Assembly, the specialized U.N. agencies and the functional conferences sponsored by these countries.

A. MINORITY POSITION IN THE U.N.

In the United Nations one must distinguish between electoral groups, based on geography, and caucusing groups based on political, economic and other affinities. Most Third World countries are members of the "Non-Aligned Movement", a political caucusing group, which consisted in the 40th G.A. of ninety-nine members. Within this numerically dominant non-aligned movement African nations represent the largest regio-

nal group. "They can bring their influence to bear directly through the weight of the bloc's 50 member states", according to Monique Rubens, a U.N. observer.² Most of the Asian nations as well as some Latin American nations make up the rest of the Non-Alignment Movement. A united non-aligned bloc holds an automatic majority in the United Nations. As Jeane Kirkpatrick noted, "support from the Non-Aligned-Movement guarantees the success of any resolution in the General Assembly".³ The absolute decision-making majority of the Third World is the all influential factor at the United Nations. Therefore the view of the G.A. differs between western observers, who view the G.A. as "a place where unfriendly majorities use their numbers to pursue conflict and where dictatorships of various stripes can impose double standards at the West's expense"; and Third World statesmen, who view "the Assembly with greater confidence; they see it as a place where the weak and the developing can protect their interests, restrain the strong and promote a more equitable world order", according to M.J. Peterson, an expert on the General Assembly.⁴ In the Western states, especially the U.S., concern over the drift of the world body has been particularly strong. In the United States the U.N. was highly criticized among conservatives, some even challenging the validity of continued United States participation. The Heritage Foundation, the Washington based

"think-tank" of the neo-conservative movement, contends that the U.N. "had turned into a largely Anti-American club dominated by the Soviet bloc, by European leftists, and by radical countries in the third world."⁵ The policy of Jeane Kirkpatrick as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was based on this neo-conservative philosophy in foreign policy issues. She spoke and acted, according to Seymour M. Finger, a former U.S. diplomat at the U.N., out of "ideological conviction, as the representative of an Administration that is, by American standards, unusually ideological".⁶ The United States delegation returned under her leadership at the United Nations, to the style of confrontation with the non-aligned majority practised under Ambassador Moynihan in the mid-seventies. Kirkpatrick did not hesitate "to stand alone on issues and has done so with great regularity. No one can doubt the consistency, coherence and firmness of U.S. behavior at the United Nations", according to Finger.⁷

The European states were more reluctant to oppose the non-aligned states directly.⁸ Instead of seeking controversy with Third World countries, the European Community tried to play a role in which it could "actively promote the reconciliation of political and economic interests between North and South", according to Renate Finke-Osiander, director for United Nations Affairs at the German Federal Foreign office in 1985.⁹ Therefore the Europeans preferred close co-

operation and consultation with the Non-Alignment Movement in order to achieve more acceptable and practical results.

These differences in the perception of participation between the Western States are real. However, all Western Leaders agree that the West is generally heavily outvoted in the General Assembly on most issues. The Western States hold a mainly defensive position at the U.N. and are usually trying to limit damages rather than advance their own policy goals toward the Third World majority.

B. PRESENT WESTERN CONSULTATION MECHANISMS

A bloc or a group at the United Nations consists of individual states pursuing common objectives. As already mentioned, groups can be divided into regional, political, and groups resulting from intergovernmental economic treaties or groups based on a common level of economic development or other common interests.¹⁰ Blocs and groups are the influential decision-making factors at the U.N. Besides the Non-Aligned Movement, groups such as the African Group, the Islamic Conference (forty-two nations) or the Arab Group (twenty-one nations) decisively influence the majority of

Third World countries.

In the Western context, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) has, as other formal geographic groups, two main reasons for existence: the exchange of informations, and agreement on candidates for elections in cases where geographical criteria are relevant. The WEOG consists of all the Western European states, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The United States, the Holy See and Switzerland are observers. The formal WEOG strictly limits itself to electoral and related questions. Examples of political groups in the Western bloc are: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which only is active if treaty matters are involved in U.N. resolutions; the European Communities; and the Nordic Group, consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Groups based on formal international economic agreements are the Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); the Organization for Economic co-operation and Development (OECD); and the European Economic Community (EEC). In these groups the member states try to co-ordinate their interests in economic matters whenever it is necessary or obligatory by the specific treaty of each organization.

More informal political groups exist for special purposes. The Vinci-Group, named after Ambassador Piero Vinci, the Italian permanent representative at the time of

its inception, consists of the WEOG countries and Japan. Here in a consultative forum, political questions and economic issues of the 2nd Committee of the G.A. are discussed. The so-called "Barton Group" discusses disarmament and arms control questions in preparation for the General Assembly session. Named after Ambassador William Barton, Canadian permanent representative (first in Geneva, later in New York), the Barton Group consists of the EC-states; Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and the United States. Participation differs, however, from issue to issue; in all these groups only a loose co-operation on an informal basis takes place. The prime motive for the foundation of these groups is mutual information instead of formal consultations, with the aim of common positions and declarations.

The interests of the participating member states in these informal political groups are, however, too divergent to reach common positions. Moreover there exists only a minimal interest on the side of the Twelve on consultations within the Vinci Group, because co-ordination of their policies in the EPC context clearly has priority. Also, the EC is so preoccupied by its consultations that little time is left for broad co-operation in the Western context. The small Nordic Group also is an example of more effective co-ordination practised by a smaller number of states than in

the larger WEOG. Therefore, the WEOG is probably the weakest of all existing groups because "its membership includes two cohesive clusters that take many distinctive positions, the five Scandinavian states and the European Community", according to Peterson.¹¹

The United States has frequent informal meetings with the WEOG group or the other subgroups. Because of the less stringent co-operation in these informal groups they lack importance for the U.S. The U.S. is not a member in any group, and thus is weakened by being the only member (along with Israel) unable to provide bloc votes as a broker in the decision-making process inside the U.N. On the other hand the U.S. is free to pursue its own aims at the General Assembly.¹²

C. U.S. AND EC AS RIVALS FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE WEST

The co-operation between the European states and its influence at the G.A. depends in part on the role of the United States at the U.N. The position of the United States at the General Assembly has therefore shortly to be analyzed.

Over the last twenty years nearly every crisis in the Third world has produced major trans-Atlantic strains between the U.S. and its European allies: the Vietnam war, the 1973 Middle East conflict, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Grenada crisis in 1983, and the American attack on Lybia in 1986, are a few examples.

The General Assembly is a natural political arena for the discussion of international conflicts and crises, and the emergence of a partial division in the Western Alliance on certain issues is therefore reflected at Turtle Bay. The evolving characteristic of the United Nations, its division into blocs, even into an overlapping series of blocs has affected the United States, which is not a member of any of the political blocs, and its European allies, in different ways. For the Europeans the "nature of the institution and the range of its agenda make the United Nations a principal diplomatic showcase of European efforts to adopt a common stand on international issues", according to Michael Hardy, head of the delegation of the EC-Commission to the United Nations.¹³ The Twelve are generally accepted at the United Nations as a bloc and EC participation is an established element of the U.N. system today.

The U.S., on the other hand, is uncomfortable with the U.N. bloc system, which it highly criticizes. President

Reagan declared for example at the General Assembly in 1983, that the "founders of the United Nations expected that member nations would behave and vote as individuals". The emergence "of blocs and the polarization of the United Nations undermine all that this organization is initially valued", stated the U.S. president.¹⁴ By comparing the EC and the U.S. position at the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick stated that the EC "operates with a notable sophistication and discipline and is usually able to reach a common position and maintain it". On the other hand, she described the U.S. role in the "multiparty political system" of the General Assembly as that of a "splinter party" which is sometimes able to work out single-issue alliances with other countries or blocs, most often with the EC, the ASEAN states or Latin-American countries. Kirkpatrick stated, that basically the U.S. is alone, because "it is without reliable allies, because it belongs to no group. The United States, she contends, "lacks the influence on processes and decisions groups can exercise".¹⁵ In the mid-1980's, The United States was generally isolated as the "ideological villain" in the General Assembly, observed Richard Bernstein of the New York Times observed. ¹⁶ The U.S. has had to face similar difficulties in the Western bloc. The author Thomas Frank stated that "we frequently find ourselves almost completely isolated, without apparent allies".¹⁷ The departure of the U.S. from UN-

ESCO at the end of 1984, and the decision of the U.S. Congress to reduce American financial contributions, were signs of the controversial and aggressive U.S. policy in the United Nations under Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

The replacement of Kirkpatrick by Vernon A. Walters in 1985 was regarded by foreign diplomats, however, as a change in style and policy of the U.S. That led to a less controversial and more positive attitude of the U.S. towards the United Nations. The Reagan Administration has started to reverse the negative trend and has focused on the United Nations as a key forum for American foreign interests, which could be severely damaged by Congressional budget cuts.¹⁸

While the United States pursued a controversial, often aggressive policy at the U.N. based on its national interests and reluctance to achieve compromises, the Europeans were far more likely to weigh domestic and regional considerations before voting with the Americans. The Europeans seemed to be more concerned and involved in Third World issues at the U.N. than their American counterparts, in part because of the dependence of Europeans on the developing countries for economic markets, colonial traditions and their geographic locations.

While the U.S. remained partially in self-chosen isolation, the other non-aligned Western states looked in the direction of the EC. The voting of the EC attracted the

attention of states with special relations to the EC states as well as other states because of the consensus building process taking place inside the EC. The membership of Denmark in the Nordic Group, the association of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth states or the economic links of Third World countries to the EC (e.g. by the Lome-Treaties) are examples of the entanglement of the Twelve with non-aligned countries. But, it is also general knowledge that common EC positions are developed in an often long-lasting consensus building process where different positions merge into an acceptable compromise. Therefore, according to Kaufmann, "other delegations apparently reason that, if the EC countries have come to a common voting pattern, that position must be based on an 'average' and perhaps consensus attitude".¹⁹

European co-operation confronts the United States also with an increasingly common European view, thus producing the possibility of American isolation within the Western bloc, which further complicates the U.S. position at the U.N.

In the United Nations the "key to policy leadership ... is a country's relationship with the developing countries, which constitute a majority of UN members... the Europeans now enjoy better relations with those countries than the United States", according to Charles William Maynes, Assi-

stant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs during the Carter Administration.²⁰ While the leadership position in the Western alliance outside the U.N. is clearly held by the United States, the situation inside the U.N. is different. The European states were during most of the 1980's in a better position than the United States at the General Assembly and could often play a leadership role in the Western Group, as well as at the U.N. as a whole.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Participation in the United Nations", Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 2, 1984, *Department of State Bulletin*, 84 (April 1984), 68/69.
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C H A P T E R I I

THE EPC PROCESS

British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, declared at the opening of the 41st United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the European Community and its twelve Member States, that:

"we Europeans have feared and distrusted, fought and plundered one another. Yet, today, twelve free countries of Western Europe can speak to the world, with a single voice... Let there be no doubt: a challenge to one of us is a challenge to all - whether it be to our liberties, interests, rights or well-being; whether it comes from terrorists or drug-dealers, from bullies or tyrants."¹

His statement has based on the sixteen year old political co-operation among the EC Member States in the field of foreign policy. The United Nations, and more specifically the General Assembly, has become one of the major arenas where European Political Co-operation is executed. The EPC became active at the U.N. after the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to membership in 1973² meant that for the first time all EC Member States were represented in the General Assembly. The G.A. is the natural forum for the Europeans to co-ordinate their policies on the many issues in world politics, reflected in the agenda of the G.A. Before

analyzing the EPC in New York, an understanding of the broader EPC process in which the co-operation in New York is incorporated is necessary.

A. ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND GOALS OF EPC

Initial efforts to start political co-operation in foreign policy issues were less successful than those that spurred economic co-operation between the European states through establishing the European Communities. It took various efforts to enlarge the co-operation from the narrow economic basis, laid down in the 1957 treaty of Rome, to a broader political basis. With the increasing necessity to deal with classical issues of foreign policy, an enlargement of the EC instruments for co-operation in foreign policy became necessary. The plans for a European Defense Community and a European Political Community, or the aim of Charles de Gaulle to establish a political secretariat in Paris, proved to be abortive efforts in the 1950's and 1960's. Only through the adoption of the Luxemburg Report in 1970 did the Member States reach agreements establishing the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The purpose of the EPC was to create an

intergovernmental structure, rather than a new common organization, in which the Foreign Ministers and their ministries could work together. The EPC is, by its nature, a dynamic framework of co-operation among the Member States of the EC , it is therefore in constant evolution. The signing of the "Single European Act" in February 1986 is the newest change in the feature of the EPC.³

1. Foundation and Development

Since its establishment in 1970, the EPC has been reviewed, and its processes revised several times. The Luxemburg Report, also known as the Davignon Report, established the EPC. The Foreign Ministers of the then six Member States agreed to co-operate in their foreign policies by regular consultations on all issues of world politics with relevance for European interests. Harmonization and common actions should be achieved, and stabilize thereby the solidarity among the member states. Following the EC enlargement with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the, then nine, members adopted in 1973 the Copenhagen Report. They affirmed and specified the EPC process, agreed upon in 1970, and proposed a more intensive co-operation. In 1981, after the accession of Greece, the ten members approved the London

Report, which reviewed the development of the EPC and adopted changes in its procedures whereby its' machinery should be strengthened and enhanced.⁴

The "Solemn Declaration for a European Union" adopted by the Heads of the Member States in Stuttgart on June 19, 1983 did not change the EPC concept but repeated the claim of the London Report that consultations in political security matters should, moreover, be included. It also contained a commitment by the Member States to contribute to the establishment of a European Union.⁵

In negotiations during different European Council meetings and subsequent Foreign Ministers' meetings following the Stuttgart Declaration, agreements on a further development of the European Community were reached. They were expressed in the "Single European Act", which was agreed upon in December 1985 and signed in February 1986.⁶ The Single European Act consists of two major parts of modest but partly significant measures designed to strengthen the EC: the first revised the treaties establishing the European Communities; while the second created a legal framework for the EPC. This second part confirmed and supplemented the procedures agreed upon in the previously mentioned reports and in "the Solemn Declaration on European Union" as well as the practices gradually established among the Member States. The most important change by that act contains the decision

to establish an EPC Secretariat in Brussels, acting independently from the EC Commission apparatus, which should support the Presidency of the EPC. 7

2. EPC Part of the European Integration Process

The Single European Act is the first treaty covering both the development of the Community through the Treaty of Rome and Political Co-operation in connecting them for the first time. Its adoption has made it possible to encompass economic and political matters and to avoid the risk of disrupting the unity of the institutional system of the European Community.

The "Single European Act" states that the "European Communities and European Political Co-operation shall have as their objective to contribute to making concrete progress towards European unity" and should achieve the goal of a "European Union"⁸ that is cohesive and strong enough to withstand any difficulties.

The EPC is a collaboration among sovereign States which had - until the 1986 decision to establish a secretariat - no special institutions and was and will further be conducted by intergovernmental procedures. Its decisions are not legally binding. The co-operative procedure is conducted in

form of exchanges of information and consultations, and if considered necessary, in joint action in matters of foreign policy. The EPC consists in the political commitment of the governments of the Member States to consult each other on all major issues where European interests are involved to reach common positions in specific cases. If agreement on a common posture cannot be reached, each Member State is free to pursue its own line of policy. No one has therefore relinquished national freedom of action in foreign affairs. Yet in many international matters the EC states have reached common positions, pursued common actions and cast common voting in international organizations.⁹

Although, the EC and the EPC are two different forms of co-operation, there is in practice often a need for close co-ordination because deliberations and decisions of the one frequently affect the deliberations of the other.

B. U.N. MATTERS IN THE WIDER EPC ORGANIZATION

United Nations matters are involved in nearly all the processes of the European Political Co-operation. Together with issues arising at Conferences on Security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE), issues handled in the United Nations establish the major fields of a nearly continuous EPC process. Besides the original goal of European integration, the co-operation at the U.N. has also added a further goal to the EPC policy: the spanning of the North and South conflict in order to revive multilateral diplomacy and to strengthen the role of the EC states as viable Western partners for Third World countries in international politics.

1. Procedures

The infrastructure of the EPC has developed on a purely intergovernmental basis by "linking foreign ministry to foreign ministry and embassy to embassy without the intervention of any extranational intermediary", according to Christopher Hill.¹⁰ All the EPC meetings are chaired by a representative of the country holding the presidency of the European Council: the meeting of the heads of governments.

The presidency rotates every six months in alphabetical order between the Member States. There are at least six meetings per year between the Foreign Ministers, preceded by preliminary discussions in the Political Committee composed of the political directors of the national foreign ministries. In preparing the work of the Political Committee each political director is assisted by a specially appointed "European Correspondent" from his country's foreign ministry. The Political Committee holds two-day meetings every month and is also responsible for management of the activities of working groups. Some of these groups deal with subjects discussed in international conferences, at the CSCE meetings, the United Nations or while others are geographically organized (Middle East, etc.). The working groups hold approximately one hundred meetings a year. In addition there are countless meetings of the ambassadors of the Twelve in third countries and in international organizations. The "Single European Act" asks the Member States to "intensify co-operation between their representatives accredited to third countries and to international organizations".¹¹

The Political Committee is also the place where U.N. matters are discussed. The "early warning report"¹² edited by the twelve missions in New York receives its final approval there. If the Twelve cannot agree on common declarations

in New York, the controversial issues will be discussed in the EC Political Committee and later in the EC Council of Foreign Ministers. The traditional statement of the presidency at the opening session of the G.A. is also received in the Political Committee after the missions in New York and before the national foreign ministries have discussed the report. The Foreign Ministers finally agree on the speech by consensus.

The European Council, composed of the heads of states assisted by their Foreign Ministers, serves as the highest body for both EPC and EC. The Council convenes three times a year and is, according to Hill, the "key element in political co-operation".¹³

A distinctive characteristic of the EPC is the direct contact between the Foreign Ministers and their functionaries. The regular and free dialogue on all levels is in contrast to meetings in other organizations, such as NATO or the Council of Europe. The EPC remains "largely self-administrating, with the chairman of working groups or the spokesman ... in international organizations and third countries providing the documentation and action required on a decentralized basis. The high number of meetings at all levels is a significant proof of the intensity of the EPC", stated Hill.¹⁴

By 1986, consultations had become so frequent that the "Single European Act" included provisions for an EPC Secretariat. It will have administrative tasks and shall, according to the Single Act "act under the authority of the Presidency". It "shall assist ... in preparing and implementing European Political Co-operation activities and in administrative matters". The Secretariat shall be composed of five officials, which are to be dispatched by the "Presidency-in-Office ... together with the two preceding and the two following Presidencies ... for a period covering five presidencies".¹⁵ This means that every member serves two and a half years, namely a full year before, the six months during and a full year after his country has the presidency. Thus the Secretariat gets one new member and loses one every time the presidency changes. The Head of the Secretariat shall be appointed independently from the other five members by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve.

The establishment of a Secretariat - a long standing proposal of EPC experts in order to improve co-operation - will mainly influence the EPC process in Europe. Diplomats at the U.N. do not expect an immediate impact on direct consultations in New York.

The participation of the EC Commission in EPC meetings at all levels is now an established fact and is helpful in providing the necessary co-ordination between the economic

and political fields of European co-operation.

Consultations with the European Parliament also take place through the presidency on a regular basis.¹⁶

2. Instruments

Soon after inception of the EPC the Member States reached agreement on common basic attitudes toward some foreign policy questions with major importance to all EC Members. The direct means of EPC are restricted mainly to diplomatic declarations, communications to other governments, joint interventions, and common voting in international organizations. The method of co-operation enables the Twelve to act on individual facts rather than on well developed strategies and conceptions.¹⁷ In the 1980's the Europeans also started initiatives and common measures in the cases of the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran crisis, the situation in Poland and the Falkland conflict.

The driving force in EPC is the presidency; which is responsible for the drafting of texts of common declarations, speeches, and interventions in international organizations.

Decisions of EC and EPC often affect the other forums of European policy. Because of persistent interactions of decisions between the two, co-ordination of their policies

is necessary. This is mainly guaranteed by the participation of the European Commission on all EPC levels and the common presidency in both organizations. In some instances EPC decisions have to be implemented within the framework of economic co-operation. This includes the imposition of economic sanctions against Poland in 1982, against Argentina during the Falkland conflict or against South Africa in 1986. It also appears when the EPC deals with political aspects of proposals for economic and financial assistance, as in the case of its relations to the Central American states. Conversely, economic co-operation can play a pioneering role in political co-operation, as in establishing relations with the ASEAN countries.

The development of the EPC has experienced success and failure. The close co-operation in the CSCE as well as EC policy toward the Middle East were early signs of a successful agreement on foreign policy issues in the mid-seventies.

At the end of the 1970's the EPC seemed to have lost most of its energies; a tendency to merely react to external events rather than pursuing its own initiatives could be observed. The early 1980's saw, according to Stanley Sloane, "a remarkable revitalization" of EPC.¹⁸ The crises surrounding Poland and the Falkland Islands confronted the Twelve with challenges which let the political influence of the EPC grow.

The growth of the importance of EPC consultations in the 1980's coincided with increased divergencies in the relations between the United States and its European allies, according to Sloane.¹⁹ Different reactions towards the crises in Afghanistan and Iran, the establishment of a distinctive European Middle East policy,²⁰ and the disagreement over U.S. intervention in Grenada strained the European-American relations. These differences with the United States contributed to EPC growth by making the Europeans desire to achieve a common position in order to be stronger in arguments with the U.S.

The common declarations of the Foreign Ministers on most major political crises and issues in the world are the basis for the co-operation of the Twelve at the General Assembly. In the 1980's the EPC council declarations on situations such as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Middle East, South Africa and Central America were reflected in EPC declarations in the G.A.

The EPC initiatives and statements clearly demonstrate the ability of the EC Member States to play a stronger European role based on their own pre-conditions, and possibilities of taking action in most major political fields. With national interests of Member States at stake the process for a common position is being complicated and increasingly elusive. Through the enduring consultations a foreign policy

of European dimensions was promoted, while the punctual (re)action on issues still overshadows the concordance of common strategies and concepts in foreign policy by the Twelve.²¹

C. EPC CONSULATIONS AND INSTRUMENTS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly is a natural showcase of European Political Co-operation. Here the Europeans can adopt common positions on all major political issues in a body which does not exert great impact on world politics outside the U.N. The policy of the powerless Third World at the U.N. consists often in insulting and criticizing the Western minority, which represents most of the worlds' economic and military power. This led to a deminishing importance of the General Assembly. The major political and economic decisions, in which the West is interested, are taking place in regionalized bodies such as NATO, the OECD, or in CSCE conferences. Co-operation is affected in New York with less severe burdens than outside of Turtle Bay. The Europeans are confronted at the U.N. with pressure by third states for a unified apperareance and the achievement of common European

positions. Third World countries expect common positions of the EC on the North-South dialog and other issues. The often uniform challenge by developing countries causes the Europeans to confront the Third World with similar elaborate conceptions. One of the major challenges the Europeans have to face at the U.N. is to overcome the North-South conflict.²²

After the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1973 the - then nine - were for the first time fully represented at the G.A., which led to an increasing concordant process in New York. The enlargement by Greece in 1981 and by Spain and Portugal in 1986 presented the EPC with new challenges, but also increased the importance of the EC bloc at the General Assembly by adding members with for example strong ties to Latin America or the Middle East.²³

1. Consultation Process

EPC consultation at the U.N. serves two purposes. First, it provides a process through which the Twelve can speak with one voice in order to convey European views and bring the weight of the Twelve to bear. Second, it assists in avoiding contradictions between national positions expressed by Member States individually. The wide range of themes on the

agenda of the General Assembly made permanent consultation in the EPC framework in New York as well as in the national capitals necessary. Major texts on international topics issued by the meeting of the European Council's Head of States, or the Foreign Ministers are furthermore circulated as U.N. documents.

The missions of the Twelve and of the EC-Commission in New York act inside the over-all EPC guidelines. The EC Ambassadors and representatives in the main committees of the G.A. meet regularly in order to co-ordinate views and to consider the position to be taken on the anticipated issues. The Twelve post a yearly report which assesses the co-operation, analyses the problems, and makes proposals for improvements. An "early-warning-report" by the missions in early summer defines the common positions of the Twelve and gives a preview of the next General Assembly session. This reflects the identification of problems where harmonizations and consultations with other states or regional blocs inside the U.N. system should be considered.

During the regular and special sessions of the G.A., meetings on the ambassadorial level convene at least weekly. These reunions are supplemented by meetings of representatives in the main committees and in special working groups devoted to major issues. The rest of the year only weekly meetings of the ambassadors are held.²⁴

Even when issues arise in U.N. bodies, with limited membership, other than the Security Council, consultations are nevertheless conducted between all EPC members. Common declarations in these cases represent the positions of all twelve member states, not just those represented on the particular body involved.²⁵

During a session of the G.A. some 200 or more meetings may be held covering the entire range of items on the agenda. This places a heavy burden on the European Council Presidency, which is responsible for conducting the EPC meetings, preparing and delivering texts and, together with other Member States and the Commission, for engaging in the diplomatic task of ensuring that EC views are reflected in the resolutions. This burden is particularly onerous for small EC Member States. Some sense of the burden emerges from a few basis statistics: during the three month period of a regular General Assembly session about fifty meetings of U.N. Committees and up to twenty or more EC co-ordination meetings are held weekly, several hundred resolutions²⁶ are adopted and fifty or more common statements of the EC Member States are delivered. At the 40th session of the G.A. Luxembourg held the presidency, but the Dutch delgation took over the tasks of speaking for the Twelve in the First Committee.

As can be seen in Table I, the number of official mee-

tings of the Twelve increased steadily in the 1980's from 176 in 1980 to a peak of 273 in 1984, and slightly declined to 258 in 1985. During the 40th G.A. twenty-three meetings on the ambassadorial level took place in the three-month period. The highest number of meetings were reached in the 2nd Committee, which deals with economic and financial matters. Here the Europeans met seventy-six times while the committee only convened fifty-two times. The impact of the strong co-operation through the EEC can clearly be seen. In the 5th Committee, dealing with administrative and budgetary matters, the Twelve met thirty times while the committee held seventy meetings. In the 6th (legal) Committee with fifty-five meetings the EC had twenty-three official meetings. Three EPC meetings took place in the 4th (Decolonization) Committee, which met twenty-three times in the 40th session. The 1st (Disarmament and related matters) Committee held sixty-two meetings, and the EC met seventeen times to discuss and elaborate common positions. In the 3rd (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee the Twelve convened twenty-four times in an overall number of seventy-two meetings, and on matters related to the Special Political Committee they met eleven times for the preparation of the forty-six committee meetings. In the last two cases one has to consider that moreover forty-three EPC meetings of experts also took place, dealing with issues of mainly these

two committees. The high, and in recent years increasing numbers of common meetings is impressive and a sign of a vivid and highly developed co-operation of the EC Member States in all fields of the United Nations. In economic issues - which fall in the competence of the EEC - and in political and human rights issues - which are dealt with in the EPC context - the co-operation of the Twelve measured in number of meetings was the highest. It has to be noticed that the high amount of meetings do not by themselves indicate, whether the consultations resolve or are worsening disagreements between the Twelve. This has to be reviewed during the analysis of the different issues in Chapter three. The increasing number of issues and the agenda of the meetings indicate, however, that more and more issues are being included in the consultations.

The majority of the consultations and elaborations of common European positions take place between experts and the representatives in the main committees. These decisions are adopted "ad referendum", then put forward to the national ministries for approval. If different positions emerge on this level, consultations take place on the ambassadorial level. If consensus is not achieved there, the issues are then discussed first in the Political Committee on the directorial level, and later on at the ministerial level in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Differences on minor issu-

es in New York do not cause the dropping of an intended speech or declaration, and are either resolved or the matter is excluded from declarations. Main differences remain on all levels equally, while most minor discrepancies can be settled by compromises in New York.

Co-operation in the G.A., as indicated by the number of meetings, has increased in recent years. The basic positions and national special interests are well known by the twelve missions, and despite the fact that common voting is not mandatory there is always a pressure for common actions from inside as well as from the outside. Spain and Portugal were, for example, willing to adjust their positions in areas - where both states' differences with other members were not strong.

Between the members of the European missions a close and familiar relationship exists which goes far beyond the common participation in committee meetings. A socialization process between European diplomats took place in recent years which led to a greater sensibility on achieving common positions and the building of a common European view. A general desire for achieving common positions is sustained between the diplomats, which is mostly independent from parties that form the national governments in Europe.

TABLE I

NUMBER OF MEETINGS OF THE TWELVE
AT THE 40TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Total: 258

Number of Meetings 35th - 39th G.A.:

1980: 176 1981: 245 1982: 285 1983: 208 1984: 273

EC Meetings at 40th G.A.:*

Permanent Representatives:	23
40th Anniversary of United Nations:	8
Experts Middle East:	23
Experts Asia:	4
Experts Africa:	13
Experts Latin America:	3
1st Committee:	17 (62)
Special Political Committee:	11 (46)
2nd Committee:	76 (52)
3rd Committee:	24 (72)
4th Committee:	3 (23)
5th Committee:	30 (70)
6th Committee:	23 (55)

258

*: The Parantheses indicate the relevant numbers of
the committee meetings

2. Indication of Common Positions Vis-A-Vis Others

The Twelve indicate common positions to other blocs and states at the General Assembly in five different forms:

- proposal of agenda items
- common proposal of draft resolutions
- declarations in the plenary's general debate
- declarations on specific resolutions
- explanation of vote

The proposal of special agenda items and the drafting of resolutions is in general complicated for the West by reason of its minority position, whereas the Third World majority can dictate any agenda point, and is - if applied - in most cases performed by individual EPC Member States. The remaining three points account for the usual presentation of EPC positions at the General Assembly.²⁷

The G.A. opens each session with a general debate in which members can make a statement about its view of the world situation. The Twelve make, during that opening session a common statement through the Foreign Minister, currently acting as EC Council President. This speech became customary during all the 1980's. The speech provides a summary of EC positions on international issues and sets the stage for declarations on specific subjects later in the session.

The statement is drawn up through a process involving both EPC and Community institutions. Statements in the general debate are "orientation" elements for the members of the G.A. and the EC statement is a considered presentation of European views, and is examined accordingly by other states and groups in determining their own positions. Because there is no systematic presentation on behalf of any other group in the general debate and statements in that debate are of considerable significance for the structure of U.N. debates, the EC statement offers an important opportunity to determine the role of the Twelve in the G.A. The issues involved in this general statement have increased over the years. The speech on Sept. 23, 1985 of the Foreign Minister of Luxemburg, Jacques Poos, "on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and Spain and Portugal" covered all current controversial issues in world politics: disarmament, human rights and economic questions, the situations in Cyprus, South Africa, Namibia, Middle East, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central America and Korea. No major political crisis was left in which the Europeans did not have common positions.²⁸

Common declarations in debates on individual agenda items have defined the fundamentals of European policy. These declarations set the essential line for further diplomatic actions by the Twelve. On issues where the Twelve

agree, these declarations explain the common European position in large. On issues dividing the Twelve, these declarations express the minimal consensus; national declarations then state more precisely the individual positions of Member States. The custom of common European declarations has increased in the 1980's, as can be seen from Table II.

Declarations of the Twelve on specific resolutions either in the plenary debate or in committees tend to be more fundamental. The intentions of declarations as well as those of explanations of votes by the Twelve are also designed to influence the voting behavior of still undecided states shortly before the final vote. Especially neutral western or moderate Third World countries often consider a common action by the Twelve in their own decision making process. Despite a common explanation of vote by the EPC, individual Member States often dissent from the majority in certain paragraphs or parts of resolutions. In these cases the dissent is expressed by national explanations of votes.

At the 40th G.A. the Twelve made seventy-nine declarations to announce their common positions, which is a decline in the number of statements compared to all the previous sessions since the accession of Greece in 1981, but still higher than in most of the sessions between 1974 and 1980 as can be seen in Table II. The number of common

declarations rose largely in the 1980's, while the number of explanation of votes declined steadily in the same period. In the 40th G.A. fifty-two common declarations and fifteen explanation of votes were delivered by the presidency. The number of declarations on resolutions increased in 1985, however, to eleven. An explanation of common vote can be taken as the strongest common statement, indicating that all Member States voted the same way; a common declaration, on the other hand, can be accessed as the weakest form of indicating common positions. By looking at the development of the different indicators of common positions in the 1980's, it can be argued, that through the accession of Greece in 1981, and the high number of its dissenting votes²⁹, the EC was less able to make common explanations of vote. The Twelve instead switched over to common declarations to express common views, even if individual Member States differed on certain parts of the relevant issues occasionally.

By observing the range of matters on which common views were demonstrated in the 40th G.A., the wide field of common positions is revealed. Twelve statements or explanations of vote were made on Middle East topics (Palestinian issues and Israel, UNRWA, Iran-Iraq and Lebanon), five on South Africa and Namibia, as well as statements on Kampuchea, Afghanistan and the situation in Central America. Eight statements were

given on security and disarmament topics; eight in the Third Committee (human rights and humanitarian and social issues), thirteen in the Fifth Committee (budget and personnel), and nine in the Sixth Committee (legal topics). Sixteen statements were produced on economic and development issues, chiefly in the Second Committee, whereas eight were put forward by the European Commission on behalf of the European Communities while the other eight statements were delivered by the presidency of the Twelve.

A statement or explanation of vote on behalf of the EC possesses a weight which individual declarations cannot have. U.N. diplomacy entails the construction of alliances between groups and the putting together of majorities, and if the Twelve are not united on an issue of importance not only are the chances of that view being accepted itself reduced but the individual states are usually left without an effective means of proceeding. The EPC framework provides such a base and proves especially effective when the Twelve are able to cast common explanation of votes, and can moreover, attract the attention of other groups at the G.A.

Statements in United Nations debates tend to be written in general political terms rather than in detail, which coincides with EPC practice. There is usually consensus on fundamental objectives; the familiar difficulties over ends and means, the elements of tactical considerations, and the

particular interests of individual Member States sometimes make the drafting of common statements difficult. Since applying the EPC in New York, the number of common declarations has increased from zero to seventy-nine in 1985. While the number of 123 declarations in 1981 was exceptionally high, the numbers of statements since then has remained around eighty to ninety. It could be argued that the correlation between a larger number of meetings, and statements and cooperation depends on the content of these meetings or statements. One clear position is worth more than four or five vague ones. The stagnation of the number of meetings in the 1980's contradicts the fact that an increasing number of issues were included in the consultations in the 1980's and that the EPC is more active than at the end of the seventies. Whether this immutability in the number of common statements since 1979 is also reflected in the voting data will be seen in the following chapters.

TABLE II

TOTAL NUMBER OF EUROPEAN STATEMENTS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Survey of common declarations(cd), declarations on
resolutions(dr), motions on the procedure(mp) and
explication of common votes(ecv)

40th session of the General Assembly:

1985 79 (cd:52, ecv: 15, dr: 11, mp: 1)

Previous sessions of the General Assembly:

1984	86	(cd:56, ecv:25, dr:5)
1983	84	(cd:58, ecv:23, dr:3)
1982	90	(cd:51, ecv:30, dr:9)
1981	123	(cd:64, ecv:59) .
1980	69	(cd:30, ecv:39)
1979	82	(cd:26, ecv:54, dr:2)
1978	72	(cd:27, ecv:45)
1977	61	(cd:25, ecv:36)
1976	50	(cd:20, ecv:30)
1975	36	
1974	15	

3. Observer Status of the European Economic Community

In 1974 the European Economic Community (EEC) obtained observer status at the U.N. General Assembly. This permits a representative of the the EC as an entity to participate in meetings of the Assembly plenary, main committees and subsidiary organs without vote.³⁰ This includes the right to speak in committees when questions concerning the Community interest are being discussed, it does not include the right to vote or to make proposals.

The EC observer mission is "bicephalous in nature ..., that is to say made up of representatives of the state exercising the Presidency of the Council at the time and representatives of the Commission", stated Hardy.³¹ The function of the EEC delegation consists in representing the Community and maintaining contacts with the U.N. and the missions of third states. Besides this external diplomatic activity it is, according to Hardy, "particularly concerned with the task of encouraging the co-ordination of the positions of Member States and seeking to ensure that EC cohesion is safeguarded."³² The delegation also provides the connection between Brussels and New York, including the supply of information on Community activities relating to U.N. matters.

The delegates of the EEC Commission in New York participate

without exception in the consultation process of the EPC at Turtle Bay. Whether statements are made "on behalf of the Member States of the European Community" and/or on behalf of the Community depends on the subject matter. The Twelve are committed to operate as a unit on all matters coming under the Treaty of Rome, in principle all economic issues, where they have delegated certain powers and functions to the Commission. As a result "in the Economic and Social Council and in the Second Committee of the G.A., they make statements through a common spokesman", mostly the representative of the EC Commission, observed Kaufmann.³³ Because the Second Committee deals with issues and policies which most frequently fall within the Community framework and where Community co-ordination and practices are best established, common positions among the Twelve are particularly strong. Here the Twelve play a "important role and maintain a greater degree of cohesion ... than in the other Committees", according to Hardy.³⁴

Most issues raised in the Assembly do not come within Community competence in a strict legal sense; some, however, do include related subsidiary questions involving EC competence. Examples include aid to refugees, and other forms of assistance in the Middle East and elsewhere. On these particular aspects, then, there are regular references in EPC declarations of the Community.

The correlation between Community and EPC elements can be also seen in the relations with the ASEAN Group and Central American states. The ASEAN co-operation agreement in 1980 provided the basis for economic and development co-operation between the two regions. This includes holding EC-ASEAN meetings twice a year at the Ministerial level for discussion of political and economic issues. This development has also led to increasing contacts and co-operation between the ASEAN group and the Twelve in New York. The relations with the Central American states and the support by the EC for the Contadora Group were initiated during the opening of the 1983 Assembly session, when a meeting on the ministerial level was held in New York. Further contacts were established through conferences of foreign ministers held in San Jose in September 1984, and in Luxemburg in November 1985.³⁵ These meetings led to common statements by the Twelve at the G.A. supporting the Contadora process.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom at the United Nations (ed), *Speech delivered by Sir Geoffrey Howe on behalf of the European Community and its Twelve Member States at the U.N. General Assembly together with accompanying Memorandum* (New York, September 23, 1986) , p. 2f.

2. G.A. Resolution 3050(XXVIII) September 18, 1973.

3. The description of the EPC in this chapter is mainly based on interviews with European diplomats at the United Nations in New York and in the Federal Foreign Ministry in Bonn. The following books deal in general with the EPC and can be used for further overall informations about the EPC: Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau (ed), *The External Relations of the European Community* (Lexington, 1974); H Fonseca-Wollheim, *Ten Years of European Political Cooperation* (Brussels, 1981); Christopher Hill (ed), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation* (London, 1983); Heinz Kramer and Reinhard Rummel, *Gemeinschaftsbildung Westeuropas in der Außenpolitik: Zur Tragfähigkeit der Europäischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit (EPZ)* (Baden-Baden, 1978); Reinhard Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), *Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit* (Bonn, 1978); Ph. de Schoutheete, *La Cooperation Politique Europeene* (Brussels, 1980); Phillip Taylor, *When Europe speaks with one Voice: The External Relations of the European Community* (Westport, 1979) and K.J. Twichett, (ed), *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market* (London, 1976).

4. See for documentation of the EPC reports: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities* (Brussels 1970-1985); Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed), *Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ)*, Documentation of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 5th Edition (Bonn, 1981).

5. See for a documentation of the "Solemn Declaration for a European Union": Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed), *Feierliche Deklaration zur Europäischen Union vom 19. Juni 1983*, Bulletin of the Federal Government, 65 (Bonn, June, 21, 1983).

6. See reports in *New York Times* 4 December 1985, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2/3 March 1986.

7. The documentation of the "Single European Act" can be found in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2/86 (1986). A decision concerning the provisions of the practical application of the Act were adopted by the Foreign Ministers on the occasion of the signing of the "Single European Act" and can be find in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 2 (1986), p. 115f.
8. Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2 (1986), p. 7.
9. See Bengt Beutler and Roland Bieber, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Rechtsordnung und Politik*, (Baden-Baden, 1982), p. 469ff for information about the legal structure of the European Community.
10. Christopher Hill (ed.), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation* (London, 1983), p. 3.
11. Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities* , Supplement 2 (1986), p. 19.
12. See for further explanation subchapter "C. EPC Consultations and Instruments at the General Assembly".
13. Hill, op. cit., p. 3.
14. Ibid., p. 4.
15. See Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2/86, op. cit., pp. 17-18 and Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 2 (1986), op. cit., p. 115f.
16. see for a detailed information about the European Parliament and the European Community as a whole Juliet Lodge (ed.), *Institutions and Policies of the European Community* (London, 1983) ,pp. 33-36.
17. See Kramer and Rummel, op. cit., pp. 20-25 and Wessels and Rummel, op. cit., pp. 29-34.
18. Stanley R. Sloan, "Wege zu einem neuen transatlantischen Übereinkommen: Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) als Instrument der Konsensbildung", *Europa Archiv*, 7 (1983), 208.

19. Sloan, *Europa Archiv*, *ibid.*, pp. 207-208.
20. The Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 was the result of the development of a common European attitude towards the Middle East problem and is built on two main principles: the right to existence and security of all States in the region, including Israel, and self-determination of the Palestinians.
21. See also Kramer and Rummel, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24. They define these two points more widely as "communauté de vue" and "communauté d'action".
22. Most of the information in this as in the following chapters are mainly based on interviews conducted in New York and Bonn. Beate Lindemann, *EG-Staaten und Vereinte Nationen: Die Politische Zusammenarbeit der Neun in den UN-Hauptorganen* (München, 1978), is one of the few detailed studies about the EC-Member States at the United Nations, dealing with the co-operation of the EC in the mid-seventies. Especially this work led to my interest on this subject and to the intention to analyze EC co-operation during the 1980's. See also the following two articles about the EC at the U.N. in the 1970's: N. Hammer, "Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit bei den Vereinten Nationen", *Europa-Archiv*, 15 (1975), 493-500; and R. Foot, "The European Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 17 (1979), 350-360.
23. The official accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities and EPC took place on January 1, 1986, but they began full participation in the EPC and EC framework in New York already on September 1, 1985. This enabled me to analyse the co-operation of all twelve Member States at the 40th General Assembly.
24. On 28 April-9 May and on 20 June 1986 a special session of the G.A. took place on the critical economic situation in Africa and the current financial crisis of the United Nations. This special session is excluded in the data from the 40th G.A. where only the regular G.A. from 17 September-18 December 1985 was analyzed.
25. This is true in the Economic and Social Council with fifty-five members and with a maximum number of thirteen Western states and other principal organs and subsidiary bodies of the G.A.

26. The number of resolutions has increased over the years from 132 in 1965 to 178 in 1975, 227 in 1980 and to 259 in 1985.
27. See Apendix III for an enumeration of all three forms of statements by the Twelve in the 40th G.A.
28. See speech of Jacques Poos, Luxemburg, September 24, 1985 in G.A. Records A/40/PV6.
29. The dissenting votes of Greece and the other Member States will be discussed in large in Chapter III.
30. G.A. Resolution 3208(XXIX) of 11 October 1974, under which the EEC was invited "to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer".
31. Michael Hardy, "The European Community and the United Nations", forthcoming article; p. 2.
32. Ibid., p. 3.
33. Johan Kaufmann, *United Nations Decision Making* (Rockville, 1980), pp. 96-97.
34. Hardy, op. cit., p. 8.
35. See report in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 14, 1985. On the occasion of the meeting in Luxemburg a economic co-operation treaty was signed, furthermore, between the EC and the participating Latin American states.

C H A P T E R I I I

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF EPC

In the past decade the EPC has matured in world politics and specially at the United Nations to a highly sophisticated element of European integration. The EPC is acknowledged by foreign diplomats at the U.N as an important common facilitating factor, while the public and many foreign diplomats are puzzled by the different parts of the European integration process. The role of the Twelve is attracting the attention of other groups, whether the Group of 77, the ASEAN or Contadora Groups or the African States. These and others have come to expect the Twelve to speak with one voice and act in a co-ordinated manner; this has added to the importance of the EC as a group in New York. This chapter examines how the Twelve have responded to these expectations. Moreover, the southern enlargement of the European Community by Greece in 1981 and recently by Spain and Portugal brought three old European cultures and Mediterranean states into a community uptil then largely dominated by Middle and Northern European states. These new states affected the feature of the European Community, now including most of the Western European states, at the U.N's General Assembly. The competition of national versus European interests in the decision-

making process of national states is also a weighty factor for the success or failure of the EPC. The permanent membership of France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council and the special role of these two states in the U.N. organization affects also the position of the European Community, and the co-operation of its Member States in the EPC at Turtle Bay.

A. OVERALL VOTING PATTERNS

The solidarity of the Twelve and the co-ordination of their U.N. policy can be observed most clearly in their votes in the G.A. This is true even with the Assembly's increasing tendency to adopt resolutions by consensus. More than fifty percent of all resolutions and decisions in each session of the G.A. were adopted in recent years by consensus. In the 40th G.A. 197 out of 353 resolutions and decisions were adopted by consensus. Except on budget items, elections, internal U.N. operations, and a few special questions, Assembly resolutions are nonbinding, and through the one-state-one-vote rule - which gives the United States and Vanuatu one single vote at the G.A. - are obvi-

ously not an accurate measure of real national power or influence in world politics. The function of seeking consensus at the United Nations is described by M.J. Peterson as:

"a procedure for attempting to reconcile differences and arrive at a decision all can accept, if not positively endorse. Consensus owes its prominence both to long-standing international tradition that states are subject only to those directives they impose on themselves and to the fact that control over votes in the Assembly does not correlate perfectly with control over capability in the international system. Lacking control of ancillary institutions capable of enforcing resolutions on states, the Assembly majority must secure implementation by persuasion rather than by coercion".¹

Yet many decisions are made by voting as notes, that votes "are a better indication of behavior in the General Assembly, since contested issues are more likely to mirror real-world problems".²

1. Voting Pattern and EC Enlargement

For the Europeans the negotiation of texts for consensus resolutions constitute, nonetheless, an important way in which to influence Third World countries in order to weaken extreme positions. Common EC positions are reflected more in consensus resolutions while resolutions decided by vote reflect

often disunity of the Twelve, as it is also the case with the G.A. as a whole. One of the few notable decisions adopted by consensus in the 40th G.A. dealt with the "Critical Economic Situation in Africa".³ and in a special G.A. session in Paris. Here consensus was achieved by pragmatic cooperation between the West - with the EC carrying the main burden on the Western side - and the African states.

The expansion of EC membership from nine to twelve has had mixed impact on the EPC process. The accession of Greece in 1981 to the European Community followed nearly simultaneously a major shift in Greece's domestic policy: The pro-European conservative party lost power to the socialist party under the newly elected Prime Minister Papandreu, whose election was based on an anti-EC platform. This, and the positions Greece took in foreign policy issues thereafter, led to an often isolationist position in the European Community. This made the consensus process at the General Assembly between the Europeans from 1981 on more complicated. The participation of Spain and Portugal in the EPC process in New York, on the other hand, was led by pro-European governments which were willing to make concessions and adopt established European positions in fields in which both countries did not possess strong interests.

As can be seen in Table III, which compares common EC positions at the G.A. from 1975 to 1985, the EPC extended

its common positions to 84.0 percent in 1978 while a decline of about 10 percent occurred in the 1980's. The percentage of common positions in each session, including the number of consensus resolutions, declined from 80.9 percent in 1980 to 77.3 percent in 1981 and reached its lowest in 1983, when the EC could agree only in 68.0 percent of all resolutions (see Table III). After that the common positions increased slightly to 70.9 percent in 1985 (the first year of participation by Spain and Portugal in the EPC process). By analyzing, if the South enlargement of the EC affected the voting patterns in the 1980's in any way, it can be observed, that by excluding the dissenting votes of Spain and Portugal for 1985 and Greece since 1981, the average for the four sessions since 1981 rates 79.3 percent, compared with 71.4 percent for the same period if the three South European states are included. Thus the common voting patterns of the, until 1980 nine Member States, declined only slightly in the 1980's, compared with the equivalent rates of these nine members in the 1970's.

In one important aspect, however, the above figures are misleading because consensus resolutions always make up more than 50 percent of all resolutions adopted at the G.A. Many, though not all, of them deal with routine or trivial matters on which there is no disagreement. In the common voting patterns of the EPC. Including them, then, makes EPC co-

operation appear more effective than it is actually.

An analysis based solely on resolutions adopted by vote gives a more reliable measure of EPC consensus. In such cases, EC members are not under pressure to set objections aside for the sake of Assembly-wide consensus. If they agree with each other, this results mainly from the EPC process.

Table IV compares the votes of the Member States in the General Assembly for all G.A. sessions between 1975 and 1985. It indicates, that the EPC achieved its peak - measured by votes - in 1978 with 65.5 percent of common votes. However, the voting declined in the two following sessions and the common vote after the accession of Greece in 1981 arrived in the 36th session at 47.8 percent, declining to 30.7 percent in 1983 and rising again to 41.5 percent in the first year of the Spanish and Portuguese participation. During all that time the common vote remained under the results from the late 1970's. In the 1980's a decline of common votes on an average of nearly 20 percent compared with the favorable voting patterns in the 1970's, could be observed. By excluding the votes of Greece since 1981 and of Spain and Portugal for 1985 again a minor decrease can be observed. The remaining nine Member States voted in 1981 in 65.4 percent of all controversial resolutions together; nearly reaching the high number of 1978. Nevertheless, also here a decline can be observed, reaching the lowest point in

1983 with 49.4 percent, and rising in the two following sessions to 54.9 percent for 1985. The decline of common votes - by excluding the three new EC Member States in the 1980's - remained, however, with slighter differences to the voting patterns in the 1970's.

From 1975 - 1985 the average common voting pattern for the EPC was 50.5 percent; for the six sessions from 1975 - 1980, before the accession of Greece, it was 59.78 percent; after 1981 the average declined sharply for the remaining sessions to 39.3 percent. By excluding the votes of Greece and then of Spain and Portugal for 1985 the average for the period between 1975-85 is 58.1 percent and for 1981-85 it is 56.2 percent.

The decline of the common voting patterns in the 1980's is largely due to the "negative" influence of the membership of Greece. But, even without this "trouble factor", a stagnation has appeared indicating that the EPC seemed to be unable to transfer the increase in consultations to an increase in common voting.

TABLE III

COMPARISON OF COMMON EC POSITIONS AT THE G.A.

Survey of common positions on resolutions, amendments and paragraphs adopted by consensus (CONS), common vote (CV) or divided vote (DV) in the G.A. from 1975-1985*

YEAR	CONS	CV	TOTAL	%	VD	%
1985	197	81(107)	287(304)	70.9(77.6)	114(88)	29.1(22.4)
1984	201	66(104)	267(305)	68.5(78.2)	123(85)	31.5(21.8)
1983	205	54(87)	259(292)	68.0(76.6)	122(89)	32.0(23.4)
1982	196	74(100)	270(296)	72.2(79.1)	104(78)	27.8(20.9)
1981	206	76(104)	282(310)	77.3(84.9)	83(55)	22.7(15.1)
1980	195	68	263	80.9	62	19.1
1979	203	97	300	82.2	64	17.8
1978	167	95	262	84.0	50	16.0
1977	166	67	233	83.5	46	16.5
1976	158	61	219	82.3	47	17.7
1975	110	66	176	83.4	35	16.6
Average % 1975-1985				77.6		22.4
Average % 1981-1985				71.4(79.3)		39.6(20.7)

*: In parenthesis are the relevant numbers excluding the votes of Greece since 1981 and those of Spain and Portugal in 1985

TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF EC VOTES AT THE G.A.

Survey of common votes(CV) and divided votes(DV) on
resolutions, amendments and separate paragraphs in the G.A.
from 1975-1985*

YEAR	TOTAL VOTES	CV	%	DV	%
1985	195	81(107)	41.5(54.9)	114(88)	58.5(45.1)
1984	189	66(104)	34.9(55.0)	123(85)	65.1(45.0)
1983	176	54 (87)	30.7(49.4)	122(89)	69.3(50.6)
1982	178	74(100)	41.6(56.2)	104(78)	58.4(43.8)
1981	159	76(104)	47.8(65.4)	83 (55)	52.2(34.6)
1980	130	68	52.3	62	47.7
1979	162	97	59.9	65	40.1
1978	145	95	65.5	50	34.5
1977	113	67	59.3	46	40.7
1976	108	61	56.4	47	43.6
1975	101	66	65.3	35	34.7
Average % 1975-1985		50.5(58.1)		49.5(41.9)	
Average % 1981-1985		39.3(56.2)		60.7(43.8)	

*: in parenthesis are the relevant numbers excluding the vote of Greece since 1981 and that of Spain and Portugal in 1985

2. National Interests and Minority Positions

The leitmotiv, according to diplomats of all missions, for the twelve European states at the U.N. consists in reaching a consensus position within EPC. Visions and reality are often wide apart as can be observed in the amount of divided votes cast by the Twelve. The proportion of divided votes ranged from a low of 34.5 percent of all resolutions adopted by vote in 1978 to a high of 69.3 percent at the 38th session in 1983 (see Table IV).⁴ On average, nearly half of all resolutions brought to a vote in the G.A. have caused disagreements inside EPC since 1975.

This result in the Assembly mirrors the wider EPC process. The lengthy negotiations preceeding the adoption of the Single European Act indicated, however, that the national governments remain very reluctant to concede certain rights in pursuing their foreign policy to a common foreign policy. The EPC is still a non-binding decision-making process, thus allowing the Member States to follow their own national interests. National interests and positions, influenced by domestic concerns or special relations to other states, either in the Third World or in other groups, often determine the voting of individual Member States rather than permanent pressure to gain common positions at the G.A.

The issuing of common declarations, even in cases where the positions differed on certain aspects between members, became a common practice in recent years. This practice allows the Twelve to circulate broad and general statements excluding controversial sub-issues. Dissenting members then indicate their views on the sub-issues in individual explanations of votes. On the other hand, common explanations of votes by the Twelve are only made in cases where they achieved consensus on the relevant resolution. This practice was rationalized by the enlargement of the EC first from nine to ten and then to twelve member states, which complicated the process of finding common positions. A further reason for this development can also be seen in the growth of consultations on all major issues without solving remaining specific differences. For analyzing the minority voting patterns the following three tables were used: Table V evaluates the numbers of EC votes in the 40th G.A.; Table VI indicates the number of minority votes cast by a Member State in the 40th G.A., and Table VII reviews the minority votes for the period since 1981. Moreover the data in Appendix I and II was included as well.

In the 40th G.A. the vote of the Twelve differed in 114 resolutions or 58.5 percent of all resolutions adopted by vote that session. The minority votes cast by the Twelve can be divided into resolutions where a Member State was isola-

ted within the EC or was joined by different partners. Thus an isolated minority, a minority of two, a minority of three, a minority of four or a minority of five Member States can be found. Most of these votes occurred as "no-abstain" or "yes-abstain" splits between EC majority and minority. Since abstention is a mild form of expressing reservations about a proposal, these splits are less severe than "yes-no" splits. Another sort of minority vote is the "three-way-split", when some members vote in favor, some oppose, and some abstain, often indicating that no strong majority can be found in the EC. The extreme case of minority votes can be found in cases where votes are diametrically opposed to each other. This means that while the majority voted either with yes or no, the minority voted exactly the opposite without any abstention cast in the EC bloc.

Fifteen times a Member State was isolated with its vote in the EPC bloc. Here Greece cast nine times and France, mainly on disarmament questions, four times, the dissenting votes. In twenty-one resolutions two members were in a minority position: Greece was thereby in seventeen cases in a minority and Spain in twelve cases part of that minority. Nineteen times three Member States and thirteen times four Member States were together in a minority. Five times five of the Member States differed from the EC majority. Three-way-split votes occurred on thirty-three resolutions, mostly

without a strong majority voting any one way. Three-way-splits were cast largely in the 1st committee on disarmament questions and on some resolutions on the Middle East and South Africa. Diametrically opposed votes occurred only three times in the 40th G.A. In one resolution Greece was the single European state in favor of a resolution condemning Israeli nuclear armament, while all other eleven states voted against it. In two other resolutions, also on disarmament questions, Ireland and Greece found themselves opposed to the rest of the EC.⁵ This low number of diametrically opposed votes is an indication that a small minority tries if possible to avoid totally opposite positions to those of the large majority.⁶

The number of times a country is in the minority in the EPC correlates mostly closely with the number of years a member state participated actively in the EC and how it is integrated in the European context. The three Benelux states are by far the most integrated states in the EPC as indicated by their low number of dissenting votes; they are basically the political core of the EPC in New York. Luxembourg holding the EPC chair in the 40th G.A., and traditionally the most integrated state in the EC, found itself only in five resolutions in the minority during the 1980's, and did not even cast any dissenting vote during its presidency in 1985.⁷ Belgium has also an impressive low number of mino-

rity votes for the same period, and differed only one time from the European mainstream in 1985, when it abstained on a resolution about the implementation of the "Declaration on denuclearization of Africa".⁸ Ten years ago the Netherlands was one of the most radical European countries in economic and disarmament issues. While at that time its position was often closer to non-aligned states, it integrated itself in the 1980's into the mainstream of the EPC. The Netherlands dissented five times during the last year, and correlated on most issues with its partners in Benelux. Especially in human right questions it kept a progressive position, which resulted in additional national declarations beside those of the presidency.

As founding members of the EC, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany share the same economic, social and political preconditions and belong also to the European mainstream. Italy was in a minority position five times in 1985, while the Federal Republic of Germany dissented seven times. The dissenting votes of Italy remained relatively constant during the 1980's while German minority positions increased in 1983 to a high of eighteen. Italy is more radical than its Federal German counterpart on issues when geographic, historical and economic ties makes it more advisable, as in the case of the Middle East and Palestine questions. The same concern is given to South Africa issues

where the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom were the least anxious states to support economic sanctions as demanded by the Third World majority. The only resolution the Federal Republic found itself in a nearly isolated minority, along with the United Kingdom, was its abstention on the "Law of the Sea" issue.⁹ In three resolutions concerning the question of Namibia, the Federal Republic abstained together with France and the United Kingdom,¹⁰ thus staying in consensus with the Namibia-Group rather than with the European Community.¹¹ These were the only decisions in the 40th G.A. in which the Federal Republic found itself in a minority position, shared with less than three partners. The Federal Republic of Germany voted only once, in 1981, against the rest of the EC, thus remaining the only one-minority vote by the Federal Republic in the 1980's. Italy, on the other hand, did not even cast one single one or two-minority vote since 1981.

Two other Member States could be found in the European center during most of the 1980's in the EPC mainstream, namely France and the United Kingdom. The position of both states is characterized by certain aspects which differentiates them from their European partners. As permanent members of the Security Council and as nuclear powers they often pursue special interests in security matters, and in disarmament questions. Because both have special ties to

former colonies and still administer small colonial enclaves, they are more sensitive in decolonization questions and problems.

France voted in the 40th G.A. eighteen times in opposition to its European partners, and voted in a similar pattern during all the 1980's. It pursues special interests in questions related to Africa and disarmament. At the 40th session it was four times in a one-minority position, whereby three issues dealt with disarmament questions.¹² France was also isolated on the question of the "Comoran island of Mayotte".¹³ Most of French dissent with the European mainstream occurred in the 1st committee on disarmament questions; especially when France's role as a nuclear power was involved. In Namibia issues, France joined the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom in their minority positions as members of the Namibia-Group; France also took a more radical position than most of its European partners on Central American issues.

The position of the United Kingdom in recent years came closer to the European mainstream. It voted within the minority about twenty a session at the beginning of the 1980's, but cast only eleven dissenting votes in the 40th G.A. Its special relations to other Commonwealth states mean that on certain issues the United Kingdom is able to "tackle" some countries, and to transmit EC positions to the Third World

bloc. Similarly to France, it had in disarmament questions in the 1st committee the highest number of dissenting positions to the rest of its partners. Together with the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom abstained on the "Law of Sea"¹⁴ resolution, and the three above mentioned Namibia resolutions. Moreover, it took a firmer stance against sanctions on South Africa than most of its partners. Its only one-minority vote was cast on the resolution about "Public Information and Public Action against Apartheid",¹⁵ where it abstained while all other eleven Europeans voted in favor. On the "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)"¹⁶ the European vote was split in three-ways, the U.K. casting the only "no" vote, while four other European states voted in favor of the resolutions and the remaining states abstained.

In recent years, Denmark narrowed slightly its gap with the European mainstream; with seventeen minority votes in 1985, compared with sixteen in the 39th and twenty-four in the 38th session and only nine in 1981. While it adjusted to the EC majority on some issues it, however, remained more radical than most of its partners in certain fields, such as human rights, social questions, and disarmament issues, where Denmark cast most of its dissenting votes. On administrative and budget questions in the 5th committee its positions were often in conflict with its European partners. Denmark was involved in five of eight divided votes in that

committee, and it cast its only two-minority vote on a resolution of the 5th committee. It approved the resolution on a "Working Capital Fund for the Biennium"¹⁷ while Spain rejected it, and the other Europeans abstained. The fact that Denmark cast just a single one-minority vote since 1981 and only four two-minority votes, less than the Federal Republic, France or the United Kingdom in the same time, indicates that it is not isolated within its minority positions but always accompanied by some other member states.

Ireland belongs more to the "hardliners"¹⁸ of the European Community, which include Greece and Spain. In all security and military questions Ireland, as the only non-NATO member of the EC, finds itself in an outsider position, most of its twenty-seven minority votes in 1985 were cast on disarmament questions. In many economic questions it is sometimes closer to Third World countries than to its European partners; in human right and social questions, Ireland is also more radical than most of the other Europeans states. All seven two-minority votes were issued together with Greece on disarmament questions in the 40th session. Worth noting is that Ireland cast only 3 one-minority votes throughout all the 1980's, indicating that, despite its high number of minority votes in the last years, it is not willing to stand alone. In cases of a single dissent inside the EPC the pressure by the other member states on that dissen-

ting country to achieve consensus is relatively strong and a member state is therefore less reluctant to change its single position.

The same analysis can be made concerning Spain, which despite its second highest number of dissenting votes (namely thirty-seven in 1985), cast only one single one-minority vote on an administrative and budget resolution.¹⁹ Spain and Portugal as new members of the EC have accustomed themselves quickly to the EPC process in New York. Both states orientated themselves very closely to the EPC process even before 1985. Both have sought EC membership for a long period, and in order to achieve positions in accord with its partners, they began aligning their views to those of the members to minimize opposition to their accession. This was specially true for Portugal which underlined its pro-European position by casting only eleven minority votes in the 40th G.A. Because of Portugal's and Spain's special relations to former colonies in Africa, in Central and South America, the two new members see themselves as a connecting link between the EC and these states. The establishment of consultations with the Contadora Group in 1984 and 1985 is an example of greater European sensitivities to Latin American problems, promoted by Spain and Portugal.

Portuguese diplomats emphasized that the position of their country was largely improved at the United Nations by

joining the EC. They expected to bring "a greater sensitivity to the other member states for the promotion and fostering of the co-operation with Africa and Latin America".²⁰ On Middle Eastern issues the positions of Portugal and Spain were more radical than most of its other EC states; towards South Africa, on the other hand, Portugal sided often with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic.²¹

Spain has a larger number of special interests, particularly in the Mediterranean and in South America than Portugal, where Spain dissented often from the EC mainstream. In Middle Eastern issues Spain cast, together with Greece seven two-minority votes on the "Question of Palestine".²² On Middle East issues Spain pursued, together with Greece, the most radical or "pro-arab" position.²³ Its dissent from its partners emerges also in disarmament and human right questions. Here it dissents, however, less often than Greece or Ireland, and about as much as Denmark. Spain can be described as a "hardliner" in many issues compared with the majority of its European counterparts.

Both Spain and Portugal are regarded as more open to common European positions and are showing a much more pro-European Community attitude than Greece. Both are "shoved together"²⁴ as a European diplomat described it, because of their common European positions and because of their relati-

vely new membership; a further adoption of common European positions is expected rather than an increase of minority positions.

Greece describes its position in the EPC as that of a "progressive force". It joins the EC in many actions and makes joint efforts to reach a consensus, and also "makes sacrifices for common European positions".²⁵ Many European diplomats characterize Greece, however, as a "trouble maker".²⁶ It is the most complicated EPC member, which dissented in fifty-four cases from its European partners in 1985 alone. Since its accession to the EC in 1981 it has cast 134 single minority votes, a number nearly four times as high as the thirty-five one-minority votes of all eleven other member states combined. Though the number of Greek one-minority votes declined from thirty-eight in 1984 to nine in 1985, the overall high number of dissenting votes remained relatively stable at fifty-four per session. In all G.A. committees Greece is the top "dissident"; the most common positions with its EC partners can be found on economic issues. Especially in disarmament and security matters, the Middle East and South Africa, Greece has the greatest dissenting position in the EC. In human rights issues, Greek diplomats described their positions as more "radical" than other Member States.²⁷ By analyzing the divided votes in the 40th G.A., tabled according to Committees in Table V and

combined with Appendix I, the following can be observed: Greece dissented on all three resolutions adopted by vote on the report of the 6th (legal affairs) committee and on all eleven such resolutions in the Special Political Committee. It also dissented in many cases in the other committees.

This relatively high level of Greek dissent stems from peculiarities of Greek domestic politics. In most of the European states an all-party consensus about the national policy in the European community has been established. In Greece the pro-European policy of the conservative government which brought the country into the EC was not continued after the anti-European socialist party gained power in 1981. This caused a "dramatic change"²⁸ in the policy of Greece in the European context as well as in disarmament and human right questions. While the Greek position shifted to a more European line in issues of minor importance during the 1980's, it remained more radical than its European partners in more controversial fields. Five years after the accession of Greece, its position is largely unchanged. The fact that Greece in controversial issues, such as the Middle East, was willing to underwrite the common fundamental statements and the overall political positions of the EPC with its wide range of issues, can, however, be characterized as progress. Dissenting opinions are in such cases often explained in a separate "explanation of vote" by Greece. The decrease of

one-minority votes in 1985 compared with previous sessions signaled a higher sensitivity of Greece to avoid isolation. The permanent pressure by other member states in order to achieve common positions seemed to show success.

The fact that Spain and Ireland were very reluctant to cast minority votes in cases where they would have been isolated influenced Greece to a much lesser degree, as its high number of one-minority votes in the 1980's indicates. On the other hand these states were more willing to join Greece or an other state in a minority vote.

The enlargement of the EC by Greece in 1981 and the following Greek voting behavior had a large negative impact on the establishment of common positions in the G.A.. The unwillingness of Greece to join its European partners on many issues became obvious in the high number of resolutions where Greece was isolated. The regular dissent of one Member State led also to a greater reluctance of other member states to make compromises. All this produced a sharp decline of common European voting patterns at the beginning of the 1980's, which only slightly improved at the 40th G.A. in 1985. The accession of Spain and Portugal restrained further the common decision process, but, differing from the Greek position, both states were more willing to adopt European positions. The majority of the Member States preserved and even increased their common policies in the 1980's; this

was, however, over shadowed by the desintegrating voting pattern of Greece.

TABLE V

EC VOTES IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Votes by the Twelve in the G.A. Plenary on resolutions,
separate amendments and paragraphes adopted with
or without a report by a Main Committee

	CONSENSUS	CV*	DV*	TOTAL
Plenary	14	21	29	64
1st COMMITTEE	21	17	40	78
SP COMMITTEE	6	14	11	31
2nd COMMITTEE	59	7	7	73
3rd COMMITTEE	59	14	12	85
4th COMMITTEE	11	-	4	15
5th COMMITTEE	15	8	8	31
6th COMMITTEE	12	-	3	15
TOTAL	197	81	114	392
TOTAL CV + DV	195	41.5%	58.5%	

*: Common Votes (CV) and Divided Votes (DV) of the EPC

TABLE VI

MINORITY VOTES IN THE EC IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSEMBLYNumber of minority votes by EC Member States in the
40th G.A. (excluding three-way splits)²⁹

	MINORITY OF					TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	
Belgium	0	0	1	0	0	1
Denmark	0	1	5	9	2	17
F.R. of Germany	0	1	3	2	1	7
Greece	9	17	15	10	3	54
France	4	3	4	4	3	18
Ireland	0	7	7	9	4	27
Italy	0	0	0	2	3	5
Luxemburg	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	2	2	1	5
United Kingdom	1	3	4	2	1	11
Portugal	0	0	6	2	3	11
Spain	1	12	10	10	4	37

TABLE VII

COMPARISON OF EC MINORITY VOTES 1981-1985

Number of minority votes by EC Member States from the
36th- 40th G.A. (excluding three-way splits)³⁰

	<u>MINORITIES</u>																			
	of one					of two					of three					of four				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
BELGIUM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	6	5	1	0
DENMARK	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	3	7	17	10	5	4	4	7	6	9
F.R. OF GERMANY	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	5	2	1	3	2	4	4	3	5	5	9	5	2
GREECE	28	26	33	38	9	9	14	9	13	17	5	10	17	11	15	3	4	5	2	10
FRANCE	2	2	2	4	4	5	6	4	5	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	6	7	4	4
IRELAND	1	1	0	1	0	6	11	7	12	7	6	9	17	9	7	3	3	5	3	4
ITALY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	4	4	6	2	2
LUXEMBURG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	5	4	1	0
NETHERLANDS	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	3	6	3	3	2
UNITED KINGDOM	3	2	4	5	1	5	7	8	6	3	2	2	6	5	4	6	9	3	5	2
PORTUGAL					0					0					6					2
SPAIN					1					12					10					10

B. PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP OF FRANCE
AND UNITED KINGDOM

The special positions of France and the United Kingdom in the U.N. organization causes them to pursue certain special interests not shared by their European partners. This is especially the case in security matters since both states are interested in keeping questions involving nuclear weapons as well as all issues discussed in the Security Council, out of EPC consultations at the U.N. Consultations with the United States and other non-permanent Western members take priority at the Security Council. Official consultations on its agenda do not take place in the EPC context; Security Council matters are discussed with the EPC partners on a strictly informal basis. France and the United Kingdom are very fearful that their historically based special status in the Security Council might be challenged if they are commonly acting with their European partners in security matters.

Since security matters normally fall outside of the scope of the EC treaties there is no conflict within the European Communities on these issues.³¹ Where legally binding instruments are involved, however, such as in the preparation of conventions on topics within Community competence, the "usual EC rules apply", according to Michael

Hardy.³²

Even if no official consultations take place on Security Council matters, most of these issues are regularly discussed in the EPC context at the directoral or ministerial levels. On such matters as the Middle East or South Africa, common positions have already been taken; these are reflected by the positions individual European Member States take in the Security Council. When Italy and the Federal Republic join the Security Council for 1987/88, there should be increased consultation on security matters expected in the EPC context, despite the fact of French and British disapproval. The different political status of individual EC members at the United Nations will nevertheless remain a handicap for further increasing co-operation in New York.

C. SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS IN MAJOR POLITICAL FIELDS

U.N. diplomacy is based on the construction of alliances between groups for achieving a majority and therefore makes the co-operation of the Twelve an important factor for success. If the EC is not united on an important issue the chances of acceptance of Western European views is reduced,

and the individual States are usually left without an effective means of proceeding. For individual Member States it became more difficult to succeed with an initiative without the support of its partners. Other groups expect that the Europeans will act together. When an individual member launches a proposal without backing of the EPC this decreases strongly the chances of success.³³ The EC framework provides a basis for cohesion and it proves to be effective for the advancement of common and individual interests.³⁴ The EPC also offers for individual members the possibility of hiding behind common positions. Individual Member States can easier rebut domestic and foreign critics by citing the pressure of partners and the necessity of making compromises for accomplishing common European positions. This was shown for example in the case of South Africa, which will be discussed below.

By analyzing the divided votes of the Twelve at the 40th G.A. in Table V, and Appendix I and II, it can be observed that in 195 votes the Twelve were divided 114 times. Splits can be found in the following areas for 1985:

- Disarmament: 40 of 57 votes;
- Middle East: 18 of 38 votes;
- South Africa and Namibia: 10 of 22 votes;
- Human rights: 12 of 26 votes;
- Budget questions: 8 of 16 votes;
- Economic issues: 7 of 14 votes;
- Decolonization: 7 of 7 votes;
- Legal questions: 3 of 3 votes;
- Falkland: 3 of 3 votes;
- Mayotte: 1 of 1 vote;
- Law of Sea: 1 of 1 vote;

The areas with the highest disagreement are mostly those issues concerning disarmament questions, legal and decolonization issues. Lack of conformity and common positions are balanced in the remaining fields by excluding the single issue resolutions on the Falklands, Mayotte or the Law of the Sea. By excluding Greece, Spain and Portugal from the dividing voting pattern, as is done in Table III, the number of divided votes is reduced to eighty-eight. The exclusion of the two states with the highest minority votes naturally affects the different issues. And if Ireland, as the third "hardliner" in the EC, would also be excluded in the analysis, the number of divided votes would decrease further. In disarmament questions, and South Africa and Middle East issues, a larger number of common positions between the remaining nine members can be noticed. Greece and Ireland cast the only dissenting votes in eleven of the forty disarmament resolutions.

Using as a criterion the votes on issues of particular importance, it can be measured with some accuracy the level of co-operation between the EC Member States in the G.A. It must be noted, though, that in some cases the resulting resolutions were adopted by consensus. Some of these issues with top-priority for the West, for example, the resolutions on terrorism and hostage-taking or drug abuses, were adopted by consensus in the 40th G.A. plenary. On December 9th, the

Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution in which it "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among states and their security".³⁵ This was the first time that the entire membership unanimously condemned terrorism. Also for the first time, the G.A. drew a clear distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters of whatever stripe. The resolution summoned the world community to action against terrorism by national measures and through the U.N. specialized agencies. Similiar action is being prepared against the international narcotics traffic. Four resolutions on drug abuse and drug trafficking were adopted unanimously, by consensus, during the 40th G.A. One of these dealt with the preparation of a new Convention against Drug Trafficking. The other concerned the international conference on drugs to be held in mid-1987.³⁶ Similiary, the special session of the G.A. in April 1986 on the critical economic situation in Africa adopted its resolutions also by consensus. Thus some important resolutions were adopted in the 40th G.A. by consensus.

To observe the European co-operation at the General Assembly closer I will focuse on five conflicts in five different regions, which were main issues in the 40th as well as preceding G.A. sessions. The resolutions I have cho-

sen deal with the occupation of Afghanistan and Cambodia by the Soviet Union and Vietnam respectively; the situation in Central and South America, focusing on human right abuses, and the conflict between the U.S. and Nicaragua; the situation in South Africa and Namibia, and the Middle East, concentrating on the Israel - Palestine conflict. All five issues are discussed in the EPC context and are also characterized by differing degrees of agreement between the Member States.

1. Afghanistan and Cambodia

In an initial resolution of November 14, 1979 under the text heading "The Situation in Cambodia" ninety-one countries demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia. On November 20, 1980, the G.A. adopted, with the support of 110 countries, a resolution putting forward the same demand in respect of Afghanistan. This marked for the first time "a reversal of the West, East and South bloc positions that had almost been taken for granted over a goodly numbers of years", wrote Heinrich Bechthold, a German political scientist.³⁷ During the 40th session, the General Assembly adopted similar resolutions on these subjects with a larger majority than before, and criticized for the first

time human right abuses in Afghanistan.

On November 13, 1985, the G.A. demanded, by a vote of 122 to nineteen, with twelve abstentions (1984: 119-20-14) the "immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan". Reaffirming "the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government", the U.N. called upon all parties "to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution" to the conflict.³⁸ The Europeans states declared in a joint statement at the G.A. that only a "true political solution allows Afghanistan to resume its status as an independent, non-aligned country and the Afghan people to exercise their right to self-determination".³⁹

On December 13, 1985, the G.A. adopted, with eighty votes against twenty-two and forty abstentions, for the first time a resolution titled "Question of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Afghanistan", in which the U.N. expressed its "profound distress and alarm ... at the widespread violataions of the right to life, liberty and security of person, including the commonplace practice of torture and summary executions of the opponents of the regime" in Afghanistan.⁴⁰ The revised draft of that resolution was sponsored by all EPC states as well as several neutral Western and Third World countries. On November 5, 1985 the G.A. adopted by a vote of 114(yes)-21(no)-16(abstention) (1984: 110-22-18), a resolution on the "Situation in Kampuchea",

demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, and the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity".⁴¹

In a statement on January 23, 1985 the European Council reaffirmed its position on Cambodia and condemned "the serious violations of human rights and of the basic principles of the UN charter" by the Vietnamese troops and called for the "withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and the restoration of the right of the Khmer people to self-determination".⁴²

Besides the fact that the Twelve agreed among themselves in both issues, the resolutions on Cambodia and Afghanistan are one of the few political issues at the General Assembly where total agreement and joint positions exist between the EC and the United States as well. The G.A. demanded, by record majorities, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In votes culminating from previous work in the Human Rights Commission, the 40th G.A. passed for the first time, with the support of countries from all regional groups, resolutions which criticized human right abuses in Afghanistan, as well as in Iran.⁴³ The adoption of these two resolutions can be described as an important change compared to previous years. Often political considerations have blocked impartial examination of human rights violations, with Western nations

charging that a double standard subjected them and their allies to criticism while shielding those in, or close to the Eastern bloc. In 1985 such a double standard was eroded.

2. South Africa and Namibia

The issue of Apartheid and the question of Namibia have been one of the main issues at the General Assembly for many years. Here the western states often face harsh criticism by African states because of their economic relations with South Africa and their reluctance to impose sanctions. The Europeans explained their joint positions with common declarations, and voted together in twelve of the twenty-two resolutions.⁴⁴ In the remaining ten votes the EPC members split their votes. The European states, together with the United States, took joint positions on the resolutions on Namibia. There they voted mostly in common, and succeeded in voting down all six cases where the U.S. was accused by name.

⁴⁵ The co-operation between the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic, Canada and the United States in the Namibia Group is also a noteworthy feature on that issue, which sometimes shifted the attention of its European members away from the EPC process to a closer co-operation with the U.S. The split in the European states occurred between

the more radical states such as Greece, Ireland and Spain, joined in several cases by Denmark and the Netherlands and the more moderate states such as the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. The Europeans were in most of the resolutions in a minority position facing the united majority of Third World countries and the Eastern bloc.

The main part of the resolutions on South Africa were incorporated in Resolution 40/64 which was divided in separate parts. The European states' common statements criticized without reservation the system of apartheid, and rejected the calling of economic sanctions against South Africa. The delegate of Luxemburg declared on behalf of the Twelve, that "only a political, peaceful solution will make it possible to create a climate of stability". He added, that the EC "cannot support the calls for the breaking off all relations with South-Africa, because isolating it would be contrary to the goal".⁴⁶ Moreover, the EPC criticized the singling out of Israel in one resolution, where Israel was asked "to desist from and terminate all forms of collaboration with South Africa".⁴⁷ The EPC also criticized in its common declaration that some "of the wording ... gives an incorrect picture of our common positions and rejected all arbitrary and unjustified attacks, whether by name or implicitly on Member States or groups of countries".⁴⁸ All twelve European states abstained on the "International Convention

against Apartheid in Sports"⁴⁹. On a resolution demanding "Sanctions against the Racist Regime of South Africa",⁵⁰ eleven European states voted against, while Greece abstained. In all other six resolutions the Europeans were divided and several Member States stated their positions besides the common EPC declaration in separate "explanations of vote". Only one resolution, about the "U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa"⁵¹ was adopted by the G.A. through consensus. This resolution was also co-sponsored by seven EC states.⁵² In most cases the European states were in the minority whereby dissenting Member states, such as Greece, Ireland or Denmark, supported some drafts but criticized the language of resolutions. This led other European states, such as the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, to vote against that specific text, while the majority of Europeans mostly abstained or joined the "hardliners". This occurred, for example, in a resolution asking for "Concerted International Action for the Elimination of Apartheid"⁵³, which was also co-sponsored by Greece, Denmark and Ireland. Here the majority voted in favor while the Federal Republic abstained, and the United Kingdom voted against it.⁵⁴ This was also the only resolution where a EC majority joined the Third World majority in voting. In all other cases the majority of the European states found themselves in the majority. The European states were also split on the resolu-

tion about the "Situation in South Africa and Assistance to Liberation Movements"⁵⁵. While Greece joined the Third World majority, and Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain abstained, the remaining states opposed that resolution. Ireland declared in its explanation of vote that it "would have wished to vote in favor", but it could not "accept the explicit endorsement of the armed struggle" in this resolution.⁵⁶ The delegate of the Netherlands rejected characterizing the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress as liberation movements, rather than anti-apartheid movements, and could not subscribe to the general thrust of the resolution, which postulated "the existence of a colonial situation in South Africa".⁵⁷ In general the Europeans as well as the United States have common positions on the situation in South Africa. They are, however, strongly criticized by Third World countries. European diplomats stated, that they differ more in tactics rather than in the aim, the abolishment of apartheid". They described the position of the United Nations on South Africa as "too extreme".⁵⁸ Some European states, such as Spain or France, supported in several cases the demand for sanctions, other Europeans joined, on the other hand, the more reluctant position of the U.S. The positions for the Europeans were mostly stated in common declarations expressing their high agreement on fundamental issues. Especially Greece, but also

Ireland, however, left in several cases the European consensus to pursue a more radical position by joining the Third World majority. The West was only able to achieve a majority for its positions, when it challenged seven invidious references in draft resolutions on Namibia , criticizing the U.S. by name. In these cases it obtained the necessary broad support to have the relevant phrases and paragraphs deleted. More important than the immediate issue was the willingness of Third World countries to vote with the West in those highly political matters, which indicated that the Western states are not totally isolated on that issue in the G.A.

The importance of an integration-pressure could be seen in the development of the European position towards South Africa in 1986 when the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic agreed after increasing pressure of its partners on economic sanctions against South Africa. Both could justify their decision towards domestic criticism by the necessity of agreeing on a common European position. The pressures put upon the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic by the majority of the EC states offered thereby for both "a way out of their disastrous situation", stated a diplomat of one of these countries.⁵⁹ This resulted in limited sanctions on South Africa which were imposed in September 1986.⁶⁰ This could make it for the Europeans "a little easier for dealing with the Africans", in future G.A, stated several

diplomats.⁶¹

3. Latin America

During the 40th G.A. four resolutions on Central and South America were adopted; only one addressed the political situation in Central America, while the others dealt with human right questions in Chile, El Salvador and Guatamala. A complex discussion took place concerning the report by the U.N. General Secretary on "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security".⁶² Only one resolution was adopted on the trade embargo imposed by the U.S. on Nicaragua. The Europeans have increased their involvement and are "newly interested"⁶³, as an American diplomat stated, in Central and South American issues. This is largely due to the fact that Spain is now working to increase its European partners' understanding of Latin Americans' views and needs. The greater European activity in Central America was seen in two meetings between Foreign Ministers of the twelve European states and the representatives of Latin American states, including all members of the "Contadora Group" on September 28-29, 1984. It laid the basis (by means of political dialogue and economic co-operation) of a new structure of relations between the EC and Central America. This

meeting was followed up by a second conference on November 11-12, 1985 in Luxemburg where an agreement on interregional co-operation was signed, and where the EC states also renewed their support for the Contadora peace effort.⁶⁴ The delegate of Luxemburg declared on behalf of its European partners at the G.A., that the Europeans "remain convinced that the crisis in Central America cannot be successfully solved by resorting to force but solely by an amicable settlement". Moreover, he explained that "the absence of any resort to the threat or use of force and ... non-intervention by any foreign forces into the region" should be necessary.⁶⁵ When the G.A. "regretted" the U.S. trade embargo imposed against Nicaragua and "requested that those measures be immediately revoked"⁶⁶ none of its European allies supported the U.S. Four of them - Denmark, France, Greece and Spain - even voted in favor of this resolution. The European states doubt, in general, the usefulness of embargos and share a common process towards the peace process in Central America. The different voting behavior of the EC Member States can therefore be related less to policy differences over Central America, than to the different degree of willingness to criticize the United States on behalf of each European state.

The Europeans also achieved agreement on the three resolutions on human right issues in Latin America. The resolu-

tion on the "Situation of Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms in Guatemala" urged the government of Guatemala to "halt violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms".⁶⁷ The resolution on El Salvador requested "all States to refrain from intervening in the internal situation in El Salvador", and asked the government "to continue and strengthen the process of reform".⁶⁸ The Europeans asserted in their joint statement that progress towards democracy in both countries was made, but they asked both states to avoid further abuses of human rights. They urged, for example, the government of El Salvador "to keep the Government apparatus and the army under control"⁶⁹. In both cases, all European states voted in favor of the resolutions, while the U.S. abstained, criticizing the text as "unbalanced", by not mentioning the "responsibility of the Marxist rebels or of extremist groups" for the violence in the country.⁷⁰

The European states agreed also in their votes on a similar resolution on human rights abuses in Chile, which demanded from the "Chilean authorities to restore and respect human rights ...(and) to put an end to the regime of exception".⁷¹ The Luxemburg delegate stated, on behalf of the EPC, that "the general process of democratization in the region had not yet reached Chile" and he further criticized the "serious and systematic human right violations".⁷² The draft resolution was adopted with the votes of all European

states, while the U.S. voted against the resolution criticizing again that "the draft resolution was still not a balanced one".⁷³

Concerning Central America the Europeans and the U.S. have "definitely two different points of view" as an American diplomat explained.⁷⁴ The differences between the EC and the U.S. consist in the assertion of human right abuses in several states, and in the situation of Nicaragua. Some European states, such as the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom, are, however, more reluctant to criticize the U.S. directly and try to avoid controversies with the U.S. Others, such as France, Denmark or Spain, are less bound by the opinion of the U.S.

4. Israel-Palestine Conflict

The Twelve achieved a consensus on twenty of the thirty-eight votes taken on Middle East issues. Nearly all of these votes dealt with the Israel-Palestine conflict. Concerning their positions on Middle East resolutions, the Europeans differed in most cases with the U.S. The high number of twenty-four votes, where the U.S. was opposed by all of its European partners is remarkable. The depth of U.S. isolation in the G.A. on Middle East issues is shown by the fact that

in fifteen of these cases the U.S. cast along with Israel the only "no" vote in the G.A.⁷⁵

Since the 1970's the Europeans have built up an independent Middle East policy and come to differ more and more from the U.S. position. With the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the previously isolated French and Italian desire for an independent European Middle East policy, less orientated on that of the U.S., received more support in the EC. This shift led through adoption of the Venice declaration to a balanced independent European view of the Israel - Palestine conflict.⁷⁶ In a common declaration of the EPC at the G.A., the delegate of Luxemburg explained that the European position for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be "based on Security Council Resolution 242(1967) and 338(1973) and should include the rights to existence and security of all the States ..., including Israel, ... (and) the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The PLO must take part in the negotiations ... (and) the principles of the non-use of force and the non-acquisition of territories by force must be respected and the territorial occupation which Israel had maintained since 1967 must be ended".⁷⁷

The EPC mainstream states are mostly united on the Arab - Israeli conflict issue. But Greece, Spain and Portugal pursue a more radical policy. This can be seen in the fact

that they cast Twelve of the eighteen minority votes on that issue. The differences between the EPC majority and minority occurs in all aspects of that conflict: humanitarian issues, issues, concerning the occupied territories, and issues arising from political proposals. In humanitarian and economic issues, the resolutions concerned aid to Palestinians, as for example the resolutions about "Assistance to the Palestinian People",⁷⁸ the "Living conditions of the Palestine people in occupied territories".⁷⁹ In different resolutions on "Assistance to Palestine Refugees",⁸⁰ measures for the assistance of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) were adopted. Mainly political resolutions, for example, four on the "Question of Palestine", which asked also for the "convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East"⁸¹, on which the twelve Europeans abstained. The three resolutions on the "Situation in the Middle East" declared "Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights ... illegal and ... null and void". They also criticized a negative U.S. vote on the same subject in the Security Council.⁸² In that case the European states, with the exception of Spain and Greece, joined the U.S. in their negative vote. Greece declared in a separate explanation of vote to that resolution, that if "separate votes had been taken,

...(it) would have abstained".⁸³ The Europeans joined the U.S. in all cases where name-calling occurred in a common effort to delete those passages from drafts. Another bloc of resolutions dealt with the "Territories occupied by Israel"⁸⁴. The European states voted for example in favor of Resolution 40/161C, which was critical of Israeli "settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied territories". In a resolution criticizing the "Violation of human rights of the civilian population of the territories occupied by Israel",⁸⁵ most of the Europeans also abstained.

On Middle East issues, the Europeans have achieved a high number of common votes and common declarations, while the dissenting votes were cast mainly by Greece or Spain. The European states are here not as much isolated as on South African issues and join the Third World majority especially on humanitarian questions. The policy of the EC shifted through the influence of the mainly "pro-arab" positions of Greece, France and Italy, to a more balanced policy in the 1980's. Arab pressure, but also the desire of the Europeans to pursue an independent Middle East policy from the U.S., led to the adoption of the minority position by the EC majority. Through the accession of Spain and Portugal an even stronger manifestation of European positions on the Middle East conflict can be expected. During the 1980's, shifts in the Arab positions affected the Europeans as well.

The unity of Arab views increased and decreased during that time, marked for example by the Arab disarray in the aftermath of the Camp David treaty, or different conflicts between the PLO and Jordan or Syria. Thus, confronted with a less united Arab positions, the Europeans were sometimes more able to influence the decision making process at the G.A.

The U.S. and Israel are, on the other hand, very isolated on Middle East issues in the General Assembly.

E. SUMMARY

Several reasons for agreeing or not agreeing on common positions between the twelve Member States of the EC could be observed.

They consist, first, on the fact that if a member belongs to a "contact group", as for example the Namibia Group or the Nordic Group, it often sticks to this contact group position if that conflicts with the one of the EC.

Second, if a member has strong ties to some outside group of states, as is the case with Spain towards Latin America or Greece towards Arab states, and their position differs from the EC position, the respective member goes in

many cases with this outsider group.

Third, if a member has developed a distinct approach to an issue, either before or after the EPC was formed or that particular member has joined the EC, as in the case of the British or French disarmament policy, the Spanish "South American" policy and the Greek "Middle East" policy, it is more reluctant to give up that position.

Fourth, if a member wants to prove certain ideological credentials that lead to positions different from the rest, as is the case, for example, for Denmark and the Netherlands on human rights or economic questions, or for Ireland and Greece on disarmament issues, that member will also dissent from the EC position.

In the decision-making process of the EPC, the national policies of Member States moved away from dissent towards the group consensus. This, however, depend also on the domestic situation in each country. The cases where dissent ended occurred in mainly two different approaches, although, with many varieties: on certain issues, as in the Middle East, the group adopted or became closer to an originally minority view as the common position. In other cases, as on economic questions, the minority adopted after a process of accommodation the position of the majority.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. M. J. Peterson, *The General Assembly in World Politics* (Boston, 1986) , p. 89. For further information about procedures at the U.N and the G.A. see also Johan Kaufmann, *United Nations Decision Making* (Rockville, 1980) and Kurt Jacobsen, *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (Oslo, 1978).
2. Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York, 1983) , p. 134.
3. G.A. Resolution 40/19.
4. See for further analysis in this and the following chapters the two Appendixes about the 40th G.A.: Appendix I lists all resolutions adopted by vote and the relative votes of the Twelve, and Appendix II enumerates all minority votes in the EC in the 40th G.A.
5. G.A. Resolutions 40/93 par. 4, 40/94H and 40/152A.
6. See for further analysis especially Appendix II.
7. The presidency is, as mentioned in previous chapters, the driving force of the EPC. The success of the co-operation of the Twelve at the G.A. is highly dependant upon the efforts of the presidency to elaborate and promote common positions on the various resolutions. The number of dissenting votes of Luxemburg, which does not have many distinguish areas of national interests, is mostly lower than those of other EC Member States holding the chair. The individual Member State, which is holding the presidency during a G.A. session, is, however, more reluctant to cast dissenting votes and rather tries to achieve consensus of all twelve states during its presidency.
8. G.A. Resolution 40/89A.
9. G.A. Resolution 40/63.
10. G.A. Resolutions 40/97C, 40/97E and 40/97F.
11. The Namibia-Group was established during the first membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Security Council in 1977/78. It consists of the then five Western members the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Cana-

- da and the Federal Republic.
12. G.A. Resolutions 40/79, 40/81 par. 5 and 40/94N.
 13. G.A. Resolution 40/60.
 14. G.A. Resolution 40/63.
 15. G.A. Resolution 40/64D.
 16. G.A. Resolution 40/21; Greece, France, Italy and Spain voted in favor, the United Kingdom against and the remaining seven EC states abstained.
 17. G.A. Resolution 49/255.
 18. Diplomats from EC mainstream states as well as a Greek diplomat used this term in interviews in New York, September 1986 for describing the more radical positions of Greece, Spain and Ireland in disputed issues. The position of the Twelve differ often from issue to issue, nevertheless, two flexible and not organized groups can be discerned among the Member States: the "mainstream members", consisting of the three Benelux states, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany; and Greece, Ireland and Spain as the so called "hardliners". The remaining members pursue special interests on certain issues, but join usually the "mainstream" states. Greece, Ireland and Spain have more radical positions in issues as disarmament or Middle East. Concerning these issues the three, characterized by their high number of minority votes in the EPC bloc, took either a "pro arabic" position or dissented with the position of the NATO on disarmament questions. Moreover they joint more frequently the Third World majority. Based in this context the two terms "mainstream" and "hardliner" were used.
 19. G.A. Resolution 40/248 on "Scale of Assesments for Apportionment of Expenses of UN".
 20. Interview with member of the Permanent Mission of Portugal at the United Nations, New York, September 15, 1986.
 21. Portugese diplomats emphasised here the high number (700,000 - 800,000) of Portugese citizen living in South Africa.
 22. G.A. Resolution 40/96A-D.
 23. Interviews with diplomats from European Missions at the United Nations, New York, September 1986.

24. Interviews with European diplomats at the United Nations, New York, September 1986.
25. Interview with Greek Diplomat of Permanent Mission of Greece at the United Nations, September 16, 1986.
26. An expression often used by European diplomats for describing the role of Greece in the EPC, made in interviews at U.N. missions of EC Member States in New York, September 1986.
27. Interview with diplomat of the Permanent Mission of Greece at the United Nations, New York, September 16, 1986.
28. Interview with Greek diplomat, op. cit., September 16, 1986.
29. "Three-way splits" are excluded because in most of these cases no strong EC majority appears any one way. If that is, however, the case, then the relevant vote is included in one of the five remaining ways minority votes occurred. See also Appendix II.
30. See previous footnote.
31. Note the provisions of Article 224 of the EEC Treaty, which states that: "Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the Common Market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security." cit. from Hardy, op. cit., p. 4.
32. Hardy, op. cit., p. 4.
33. Based on Interviews with European and U.S. diplomats as well as with representatives from non-aligned states and members of the U.N. Secretariat at the United Nations, New York, September 1986.
34. See for example Michael Hardy, op. cit., and Beate Lindemann *EG-Staaten und Vereinte Nationen*, op. cit., for a broad information.
35. G.A. Resolution 40/61.
36. G.A. Resolutions 40/120, 40/121, 40/122 and 40/129.

37. Heinrich Bechthold, "Cambodia and Afghanistan before the U.N.", *Aussenpolitik, German Foreign Affairs Review*, 36 No. 2 (1985), 299. This essay gives a fair summary and interpretation of both issues at the General Assembly.
38. G.A. Resolution 40/12.
39. EPC Statement in G.A. Records A/40/PV 71. See also statement of the EPC Council of Foreign Ministers on July 23, 1985 on the situation in Afghanistan in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 7/8 (1985) 104.
40. G.A. Resolution 40/137. See discussion and EPC statement in the 3rd Committee and in the Plenary in G.A. Records A/40/C.3/SR 54 and SR 59, and A/40/PV 116.
41. G.A. Resolution 40/7. See discussion in 5th Committee and Plenary in G.A. Records A/40/C.5/SR 25 and A/40/PV 60-63.
42. EPC Statement by the Council of Foreign Ministers on Jan. 23, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1 (1985), 52f. See also EPC Statement in G.A. Records A/40/PV 61.
43. G.A. Resolution 40/141.
44. See beside statements by the Twelve at the U.N. also the following declarations by the European Council on South Africa in 1985, on March 25, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 3 (1985), p. 70; on April 29, 1985, *ibid.*, 4 (1985), p. 60; on July 23, 1985, *ibid.*, 7-8 (1985), p. 104; on September 10, 1985, *ibid.*, 9 (1985), p. 76-77 and on November 19, 1985, *ibid.*, 11 (1985), p. 110.
45. G.A. Resolution 40/97A and 40/97B.
46. EPC Statement in G.A. Records A/40/PV 51. See also discussions in the Special Political Committee, the 5th Committee and in the Plenary on Resolution 40/64: A/40/SPC/PV 10-16, A/40/C.5/SR 58-59, A/40/PV 51-57 and 111.
47. G.A. Resolution 40/64E.
48. EPC Statement G.A. Records A/40/PV 111.
49. G.A. Resolution 40/64G.

50. G.A. Resolution 40/64A.
51. G.A. Resolution 40/64H.
52. Co-sponsors were Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands.
53. G.A. Resolution 40/64I.
54. See specially the explanation of votes of several European states in G.A. Records A/40/PV 51-57 and 111.
55. G.A. Resolution 40/64B.
56. Explanation of vote by Ireland, G.A. Records A/40/111.
57. Explanation of vote by the Netherlands, G.A. Records A/40/111.
58. Interviews with European diplomats at the United Nations, New York, September 1986.
59. Based on interviews with German and British diplomats at the U.N., New York, September 1986.
60. See reports in *New York Times*, September 17, 1986 p. A1 and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 17, 1986 for information about European sanctions on South Africa and the process of finding a common position in the EC.
61. Interviews with European diplomats at the United Nations, New York, September 1986.
62. Report of the Secretary General on Central America G.A. Documents A/40/737.
63. Interviews at the Permanent Mission of the United States at the U.N., New York, September 17, 1986.
64. See report in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 14, 1985, and the joint political communique on political dialogue and economic co-operation between the countries of the EC, Spain and Portugal, and the countries of Central America and of the Contadora Group on November 12, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 11 (1985), p. 23-25.
65. EPC Statement G.A. Records A/40/PV 89. See also declaration of the European Council on Central America on

- September, 10, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 9 (1985), p. 77.
66. G.A. Resolution 40/188. See especially discussion in 2nd Committee: G.A. Records A/40/C.2/SR 4, SR 29 and SR 46. The explanation of vote by the EC can be find in A/40/C.2/SR 29.
67. G.A. Resolution 40/140. See U.N. report in G.A. Documents A/40/1007 and the discussion in the 3rd Committee and the Plenary in: G.A. Records A/40/C.3/SR 54, 66, 69 and 71 as well as in A/40/PV 116.
68. G.A. Resolution 40/139. See discussion in the 3rd Committee and the Plenary in G.A. Records, cit. in Footnote 66.
69. EPC explanation of vote in the 3rd Committee, G.A. Records A/40/C.3/SR.54.
70. U.S. explanation of vote in the 3rd Committee, G.A. Records A/40/C.3/SR.7.
71. G.A. Resolution 40/145. See for relevant G.A. Records previous notes.
72. EPC Statement in 3rd Committee G.A. Records A/40/C.3/SR.54. See also Declaration on Chile by the European Council on September 10, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 9 (1985), pp. 77-78.
73. U.S. explanation of vote in 3rd Committee G.A. Record A/40/C.3/SR.71.
74. Interviews at the Permanent Mission of the United States at the U.N., New York, September 17, 1986.
75. Joseph J. Shattan, "Israel, the United States, and the United Nations" *World Affairs*, 143, No. 4 (Spring 1981), 335-345 and Thomas Koszinowski, "The Middle East Problem and the United Nations", *Aussenpolitik, German Foreign Affairs Review*, 36, No. 3 (1985), 306-314 give a fair summary and interpretation of the discussion of the Middle East issue at the General Assembly.
76. see note to Venice declaration in Chapter II, Footnote 20.
77. EPC Statement G.A. Record A/40/SPC/SR.18. See also statement on the Middle East by the European Council on

April, 29, 1985 in: Commission of the European Communities (ed), *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 4 (1985), pp. 59-60.

78. G.A. Resolution 40/170. See discussion in 2nd Committee and Plenary in G.A. Records A/40/C.2/SR 22 and 30, A/40/PV 119. The explanation of vote by the EPC can be find in A/40/C.2/SR 30.

79. G.A. Resolution 40/210. See discussion in 2nd Committee and explanation of vote by the EPC in G.A. Records A/40/C.2/SR 14 and 30.

80. G.A. Resolutions 40/165 A-K. See discussion in the Special Political Committee with declaration and explanation of vote by the Twelve in G.A. Records A/40/SPC/SR.25 and 34.

81. G.A. Resolutions 96A-D. See discussion in 5th Committee and in the Plenary in G.A. Records A/40/C.5/SR 60, A/40/PV 98, 100-103 and 114. A declaration of the EC on the agenda item and one on the specific resolutions are in A/40/PV 101 and 114.

82. G.A. Resolution 40/168A-C. See discussion in the Plenary and two declarations of the EC in G.A. Records A/40/PV 105 and 118.

83.. Greece explanation of vote G.A. Records A/40/PV 118.

84. G.A. Resolutions 40/161A-G. See discussion in Special Political Committee and in the Plenary in A/40/SPC/SR 16-23 and 27, A/40/PV 118. The EC declaration can be find in A/40/SPC/SR 18.

85. G.A. Resolution 40/161D.

C O N C L U S I O N

THE EPC AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE 1980'S:

AN ASSESSMENT

The European Community has gone a long way toward integration but it is still not a federal structure, let alone a single political and economic entity. Yet, the Co-operation of the Member States within the framework of the European Political Co-operation has enabled the Twelve to speak on more foreign policy issues with "one voice". The EPC also provides a classic example of success in achieving common positions and in implementing common actions, which increases the desire of the participants for further co-operation. The team work at the General Assembly has shown that the more the Europeans act as a group the more they are accepted as an international partner for dialogue, and as a major political factor at the United Nations. The G.A. is one of the most important forums for the permanent practice of the EPC. The examples of EPC initiatives clearly demonstrate the will and ability of the Member States to play a more cohesive European role based on their own preconditions and their possibilities of taking action. The Twelve are now generally acknowledged by Third World countries as a political bloc on most issues in the General Assembly.

The direct and permanent co-operation of all participants of the national decision making process in the EPC co-ordination has mobilized in the foreign ministries a large amount of professional skill, political knowlegde and special experiences for the European co-operation. Personal relations, a detailed knowledge of the co-ordination process, and confident talks have established a firm foundation for the multilateral decision-making process in the EPC. Based on that "esprit de corps" a European "Zeitgeist" was established, enabling the partners to create highly flexible co-operation mechanisms and thereby facilitate the adaptation to political circumstances.

The number of consultations and of issues considered has increased over the years on all levels of the EPC. The augmenting number of consultations has, however, shown the internal limits of co-operation. The principle of consensus expects unanimity of all Member States on basic questions of foreign policy, and this can collide with domestic politics and national interests. Despite the fact that the European states have reached consensus on all major issues at the General Assembly, which resulted in a high number of common declarations, these statements often reflect agreement on fundamental positions. Dissenting positions of individual Member States on certain aspects of that issue were reflected in national "explanations of vote", or other forms of

declarations.

Different voting pattern occurred despite these common fundamental positions, because of different judgments either on draft resolutions, the political - psychological importance of resolutions or as a consequence of special tactical national manoeuvres. The desire to display national profiles, as well as the pursuance of special political and economic interests towards the Third World, are in many cases stronger than the permanent pressure inside the EPC for achieving common European positions.

The differences in circumstances between Member States; varying in their governments and political tendencies, size and economic situations, remained an important negative factor in achieving common positions in the EPC context.

The EPC at the General Assembly has reached its limits under contemporary conditions; the co-ordination process has risen to a degree which does not offer many possibilities for further technical improvements. The Twelve are now locked in the present status of integration they have achieved. The same differences emerge again and again as long as they are not discussed and solved on higher levels in Europe.

Moreover, the enlargement of the EPC has increased the difficulties for consensus positions. As Stanley Hoffmann states, "the price of broader membership is a far more con-

tentious process of decision, and harder bargaining among divergent interests rather than upgrading the common interest".¹ The accession of Greece in 1981 proved to be a handicap for an expansion of common positions, as reflected in the declining number of common votes in the 1980's. Greek disagreement with the rest of its partners on several main issues has created a disintegrating tendency, and has led to a halt of common voting patterns. The dissention of Greece made it easier for others to break out of the European mainstream, and join Greece in its minority position.

The participation of Portugal and Spain in the 40th General Assembly, however, did not lead to an increasing disintegration as one might expect from their greater sympathy towards Third World positions. Both states were integrated without much complications in the EPC process, and adopted in many fields the already established European positions. How and if this will have a reverse influence on the disintegrating influence of Greece has to be seen in future G.A. sessions. The first positive change in Greece's policy can be seen in the decline of isolated votes at the 40th G.A.

The establishment of a EPC Secretariat in Brussels naturally will influence the co-operation in New York, which under present conditions has reached its technical limits. The EPC Secretariat will offer more coherence, though no im-

mediate changes can be expected. Its establishment will increase the coherence of the EPC process and could so serve as an additional integrative supportive factor for the EPC.

The pressure for integration is not yet strong enough to lead to agreed positions throughout and the submission of an array of distinctive EC proposals at the General Assembly. The scope of what has been achieved so far is, however, not to be underestimated. It is no longer possible for an individual Member State to hope to succeed with an initiative without the help of its partners, or indeed even to consider launching a proposal without recourse to common mechanisms.

From the political scientists' viewpoint the EPC is interesting because the co-operation represents a unique connection of different organizational principles. For the study of international organizations the EPC offers a material that can give important impetus for critical discussion of the functionalism theory, and future theory construction in the field of integration-research.

The building of the European Community confirmed, up until the mid-1960's, the position of neo-functionalism which expected that a political integration would follow the functional co-operation as a "by-product". From the late 1960's the theoretical criticism of neo-functionalism increased in the light of a stagnation of the European integration

process. On the other hand, intergovernmental co-operation became during the 1970's more and more important, as can be seen in the increasing importance of the summit diplomacy by the European Council and in the form of the European Political Co-operation. The EPC combines the functional multilateral EC organization with the intergovernmental co-operation of the twelve national foreign ministries. By acting in the forum of the United Nations, the EPC offers a connection between the U.N. and the EC, which enables a harmonization of both, mostly on the basis of the organizational principle of the EPC, affectuated preliminarily through the permanent missions. Thus the EC receives through the EPC a broader showcase for proving the possibilities of the European integration process.

The relations between the twelve European states and the United States at the General Assembly in the 1980's were complicated by the controversial and aggressive policy of the U.S., under Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, toward the Third World. Though both partners are in a minority position at the U.N., the Europeans were more able to deal with developing countries, while the U.S. often attracted hostility at the General Assembly.

The overall isolation of the U.S. led to a political revalorization of the EC group at the General Assembly. The Europeans acted increasingly as a unit in the diplomatic

arena of the U.N. Thus, they were enabled to take over the Western leadership role, which was given up by the U.S., in the dialogue with the Third World.

In the long run, however, a disappointed and isolated America, which prepared to retreat from the United Nations, would weaken decisively the position of the Twelve. Europe can, in the long-term, only gain in influence and weight when the position of the West as a whole - with the inclusion of the U.S. - can be strengthened toward the Eastern Bloc and the Third World at the General Assembly. The change-over in the U.S. mission at the U.N., from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to Vernon A. Walters as U.S. ambassador, altered the style of the U.S. policy, which was reflected also in an improvement in the climate between the western partners.

The success of the EPC is impressive, the Twelve have reached a solid substratum of agreement, aided by common presentation of views whenever possible. The EPC at the U.N. has sometimes acted as a model for further European co-operation. Progress in political co-operation in New York will remain, nonetheless, highly dependant on a further development of the European Community into a European Union.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Stanley Hoffmann, "The U.S. and Western Europe: wait and worry", *Foreign Affairs*, 63 No. 3 (1985), 646.

APPENDICES A - C

APPENDIX A

Votes of the Twelve in the 40th General Assembly

APPENDIX B

Divided Votes of the Twelve in the 40th General Assembly

APPENDIX C

Common Statements by the Twelve in the 40th General Assembly

Abbreviations used as follows: European Community = EC; Belgium = B; Denmark = DE; Federal Republic of Germany = FRG; France = F; Ireland = IRL; Luxemburg = LUX; Netherlands = NL; United Kingdom = UK; Portugal = P; Spain = S; Common Vote = CV; Divided Vote = DV; Resolution = RES. Common Declaration = CD; Common Declaration on Resolution = DR; Explanation of Common Votes = ECV

APPENDIX A

VOTES OF THE TWELVE IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Table of Votes by the Twelve on the resolutions, amendments and important paragraphs cast in the 40th G.A. Plenary

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN		VOTE	B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S*
	1986		PLENARY														
	Yes		No	Ab													
	VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE																
40/2	10/16	Credentials of representatives to the 40th GA	Consensus														
		Motion of not taking action to amendment															
		A/40/L.3 (Israeli credentials)	80	41	20	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/5	10/25	Co-operation between the U.N. aand the League of Arab States	133	2	2	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	1/11	Amendment A/40/L.10, L.9 (Iranian proposal)	79	2	50	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/6	1/11	Israeli aggression against Iraqi nuclear installations	88	13	39	DV	N	N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	A	A
40/7	5/11	Situation in Kampuchea	114	21	16	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/11	11/11	Right of peoples to peace	109	0	29	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/12	11/13	Situation in Afghanistan	122	19	12	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/19	11/21	Return of cultural property to the countries of their origin	123	0	15	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/21	11/27	Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	107	4	41	DV	A	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	N	A
		1st British amendment	38	60	43	DC	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N
		2nd British amendment	36	57	47	DV	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN															
			PLENARY				B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
			Yes	No	Ab	EC												
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE																		
40/56	12/2	25th anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries	139	0	13	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/57	12/2	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	141	3	7	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	N	Y	Y
40/58	12/2	Dissemination of information on decolonization	142	3	6	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
40/62	12/9	Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte	117	1	22	DV	A	A	A	A	N	A		A	A	A	A	A
40/63	12/10	Law of the Sea	140	2	5	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/64		Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa:																
40/64A	12/10	Comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime South Africa	122	18	14	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/64B	12/10	Situation in South Africa and assistance to the liberation movements	128	8	18	DV	N	A	N	Y	N	A	N	N	A	N	N	A
40/64C	12/10	World Conference on Sanctions	137	6	10	DV	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	N	A	A	N	N	A
40/64D	12/10	Public information and action against apartheid	150	0	5	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/64E	12/10	Relations between Israel and South Africa	102	20	30	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A	A	A
40/64F	12/10	Programme of work of Special Committee against Apartheid	141	2	12	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	N	A	A
40/64G	10/12	International Convention against Apartheid in Sports	125	0	24	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/64I	10/12	Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid	149	2	4	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
40/96A	12/12	Question of Palestine	128	2	22	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P S															
			PLENARY				B R				R U L R							
			Yes	No	Ab	EC	G				L				X			
			VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE															
40/96B	12/12	Question of Palestine	129	3	20	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/96C	12/12	Question of Palestine	131	3	18	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/96D	12/12	Question of Palestine	107	3	41	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		Paragraph 4 of preamble	84	22	38	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
		Paragraph 8 of preamble	79	33	32	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		Paragraph 2	111	6	29	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
		Paragraph 5	89	22	33	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
40/97		Question of Namibia:																
40/97A	12/13	Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa	131	0	23	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		separate vote on the words "United States" in paragraph 24	63	55	30	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on the words "the United States" in paragraph 25	59	58	29	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on the words "in particular US and Israel" in paragraph 37	58	57	29	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on the words "Israel" in paragraph 46	79	47	25	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/97B	12/13	Implementation of Security Council Resolution 435	130	0	25	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		separate vote on the words "US and" in 6th line of preamble	64	55	29	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on paragraph 11	59	40	47	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on the words "and the government of the United States" in paragraph 12	54	63	29	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		separate vote on paragraph 15	81	30	34	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/97C	12/13	Programme of work of the U.N. Council for Namibia	147	0	6	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/97D	12/13	Information and mobilization of public opinion	132	0	23	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/97E	12/13	U.N. Fund for Namibia	148	0	6	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN	VOTE	B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
1986			PLENARY													
			Yes No Ab BC													
							G			L	X					

VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE

40/97F	12/13	Special session of the G.A. on the question of Namibia	148	0	6	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/168A	12/16	The situation in the Middle East Paragraph 10	98	19	31	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
			64	33	41	CV	N	N		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/168B	12/16	The situation in the Middle East	86	23	37	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
40/168C	12/16	The situation in the Middle East	137	2	10	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

40/18	11/18	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	76	0	12	DV	A	Y	A	Y		Y	A	A		A	A	Y
40/79	12/12	Implementation of resolution 39/51 (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	139	0	7	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/80A	12/12	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	124	3	21	DV	A	A	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	N	A	A
40/80B	12/12	Idem	121	3	24	DV	A	A	A	Y	N	A	A	A	A	N	A	A
40/81	12/12	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	116	4	29	DV	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	Y	N	A	Y
		Paragraph 4	84	4	55	DV	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	Y	N	A	Y
		Paragraph 5	94	12	35	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/83	12/12	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	104	3	41	DV	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/84	12/12	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons	Consensus															
40/85	12/12	Convention on the security of non-nuclear-weapon states	101	19	25	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN															
			PLENARY				B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
			Yes	No	Ab	EC												
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE																		
40/86	12/12	International arrangements against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	142	0	6	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/87	12/12	Prevention of an arms race in outer space Paragraph 5 Paragraph 9	151	0	2	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
			123	2	21	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
			136	2	11	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/88	12/12	Implementation of resolution 39/60	120	3	29	DV	A	A	A	Y	N	A	A	A	A	N	A	A
40/89A	12/12	Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa	148	0	6	DV	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/89B	12/12	Nuclear capability of South Africa	135	4	14	DV	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	N	A	Y
40/90	12/12	Prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction	128	1	21	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/91B	12/12	Reduction of military budgets	113	13	15	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/92A	12/12	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	93	15	41	DV	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/92C	12/12	Idem	112	16	22	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/93	12/12	Israeli nuclear armament Paragraph 4 Paragraph 5	101	2	47	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
			91	24	28	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
			89	22	32	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/94		General and complete disarmament:																
40/94A	12/12	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	128	0	8	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/94F	12/12	Study on the naval arms race	146	1	3	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/94G	12/12	Prohibition of fissionable material for weapons	145	1	7	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
40/94H	12/12	Nuclear-weapon freeze	120	19	59	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN		VOTE	B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
1986			PLENARY					B	R		R		U	L	R		
			Yes	No	Ab	EC		G			L		X				
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE																	
40/94I	12/12	Limitation and reduction of naval armaments (confidence-building measures)	71	19	59	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N
40/94K	12/12	Objective information on military matters	107	13	16	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/94L	12/12	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	131	0	16	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/94M	12/12	Third Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	138	0	11	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
40/94N	12/12	Disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security	99	0	53	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/150	12/16	Economic and social consequences of the armaments race	139	1	7	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y
40/151		<i>Review and implementation of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly:</i>															
40/151A	12/16	Disarmament and international security	123	1	23	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/151B	12/16	World Disarmament Campaign	139	0	11	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
40/151C	12/16	Nuclear-arms freeze	131	10	8	DV	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	A	A	N	A
40/151D	12/16	World Disarmament Campaign(actions and activities)	114	0	34	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/151E	12/16	Freeze on nuclear weapons	126	12	10	DV	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	A
40/151F	12/16	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126	17	6	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N
40/151H	12/16	U.N. programme of fellowships on disarmament	148	1	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

RES	DATE		VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P S														
	1986	CONTENTS	PLENARY														
			Yes	No	Ab	EC											
								G				L		X			
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE																	
40/152		Review of the implementation of the recommendations of the 10th special session of the G.A.:															
40/152A	12/16	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	123	19	7	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
40/152B	12/16	Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations	107	0	40	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/152C	12/16	Nuclear-weapons in all aspects	117	19	11	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	N	N	N
40/152E	12/16	Disarmament Week	129	0	22	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/152G	12/16	Climatic effects of nuclear war	141	1	10	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
40/152H	12/16	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	70	11	65	DV	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	A	N	N
40/152I	12/16	International co-operation for disarmament	109	19	17	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N
40/152J	12/16	Recommendations of the 10th special session	128	0	20	DV	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
40/152M	12/16	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	133	2	18	DV	A	A	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	A	A
40/152N	12/16	Recommendations of the 10th special session	135	13	5	DV	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	N	N	N	N
40/152P	12/16	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	131	16	6	DV	N	A	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
40/152Q	12/16	Prevention of nuclear war	136	3	14	DV	A	A	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	N	A
40/156A	12/16	Question of Antarctica	96	0	11	CV						A		A		A	
40/156B	12/16	Idem	92	0	14	CV						A		A		A	
40/156C	12/16	Idem	100	0	12	CV						A		A		A	
40/158	12/16	Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	127	0	26	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/159	12/16	Implementation of the collective security provisions of the U.N. Charter	114	21	16	DV	N	A	N	Y	N	A	N	N	N	N	N

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN PLENARY	VOTE	B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
	1986		Yes	No	Ab	EC		G		L	X					
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE																
40/161		<i>Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories:</i>														
40/161A	12/16	Idem	95	2	37	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/161B	12/16	Idem	137	1	6	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Paragraph 1	139	1	4	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/161C	12/16	Idem	138	1	6	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/161D	12/16	Idem	109	2	34	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
		Paragraph 6	85	19	37	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A
		Paragraph 21	136	1	7	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/161E	12/16	Idem	126	1	19	DV	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
		Paragraph 1	110	2	33	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/161F	12/16	Idem	136	1	10	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/161G	12/16	Idem	112	2	32	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
		Paragraph 2	96	2	45	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/164A	12/16	Questions relating to information	121	19	8	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	A
40/164B	12/16	Idem	122	16	9	DV	N	N	N	A	A	A	A	N	N	A
40/165		<i>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA):</i>														
40/165A	12/16	Assistance to Palestine refugees	149	0	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/165D	12/16	Offers of grants and scholarships	147	0	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/165E	12/16	Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip	146	2	2	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/165F	12/16	Resumption of the distribution to Palestine refugees	127	20	4	DV	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	A

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P S													
			PLENARY				E R				E U L R					
			Yes	No	Ab	EC	G				L X					
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE																
40/165G	12/16	Population and refugees displaced since 1967	127	2	23	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y Y
40/165H	12/16	Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties	122	2	26	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y Y
40/165I	12/16	Protection of Palestine refugees 7th line of preamble	116	2	33	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
			101	16	29	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A
40/165J	12/16	Palestine refugees in the West Bank	146	2	2	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/165K	12/16	University of Jerusalem for Palestine refugees	149	2	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/167	12/16	Israel's decision to build a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea	150	1	0	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE																
40/169	12/17	Economic development projects in the occupied Palestinian territories	138	2	7	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/170	12/17	Assistance to the Palestinian people	145	2	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/173	12/17	International economic security	96	19	28	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
40/182	12/17	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States	134	1	19	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/183	12/17	Specific action related to the particular needs and problems of land-locked developing countries Paragraph 1	152	0	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
			116	1	29	DV	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A
40/185	12/17	Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries	128	19	7	DV	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A
40/188	12/17	Trade embargo against Nicaragua	91	6	49	DV	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
40/191	12/17	Reverse transfer of technology	151	1	0	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN															
			PLENARY				B D F G				I I L N				U P S			
			Yes	No	Ab	EC	E R G				R U L X							

VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE

40/197	12/17	Remnants of war	132	0	23	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/200	12/17	International co-operation in the field of the environment	149	0	6	DV	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	
		Paragraph 7 of preamble	123	8	17	DV	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	A	Y	N	N	A
40/201	12/17	Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories	153	2	1	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/207	12/17	Long-term trends in economic development	141	1	12	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A

VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE

40/23	11/29	National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress	133	1	11	DV	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
40/25	11/29	Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the granting of independence for effective guarantee and observance of human rights	118	17	9	DV	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	A	A
		Paragraph 26	84	5	39	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/27	11/29	Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	120	1	24	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		3rd line of preamble	114	9	16	DV	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A
		5th paragraph	118	11	14	DV	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
		8th paragraph	119	11	12	DV	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
40/28	11/29	Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	136	1	9	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
		4th paragraph	93	9	32	DV	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A
		5th paragraph	122	1	22	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		13th paragraph	122	0	23	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/100	12/13	World social situation	127	1	24	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P S															
			PLENARY		Ab	BC	E R		G	L	X	U	L	K	S			
			Yes	No														
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE																		
40/111	12/13	Human rights and use of scientific and technological developments	127	9	16	DV	N	A	N	Y	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	A
40/112	12/13	Human rights and scientific and technological developments	131	0	22	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/114	12/13	Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights	134	1	19	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y
		8th line of preamble	125	7	20	DV	A	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	A	N	A	A
		10th line of preamble	130	1	23	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		11th line of preamble	130	7	17	DV	A	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	A	A
40/124	12/13	Alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms	130	1	22	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
40/137	12/13	Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan	80	22	40	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/139	12/13	Situation of human rights and fundamental freedom in El Salvador	100	2	42	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/140	12/13	Situation of human rights and fundamental freedom in Guatemala	91	8	47	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/141	12/13	Situation of human rights in Iran	53	30	45	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/145	12/13	Situation of human rights and fundamental freedom in Chile	38	11	47	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/148	12/13	Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist activities all other forms of totalitarian ideologies	121	2	27	CV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		7th line of preamble	106	19	13	CV	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P S													
1986			PLENARY													
			Yes	No	Ab	EC										
							G			L	X					
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE																
40/50	12/2	Question of Western Sahara	96	7	39	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y
40/51	12/2	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories	149	0	3	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y
40/52	12/2	Activities of foreign economic and other interests	125	9	16	DV	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	A
40/53	12/2	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized U.N. agencies	126	3	22	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	N	A
ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE																
40/59A	12/2	Financing of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force	96	2	13	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/59B	12/2	Idem	93	10	6	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/239A	12/18	Final budget appropriations for the biennium 1984-1985	125	12	10	DV	A	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	A	N	A
40/241B	12/18	Financial emergency of the United Nations	132	12	2	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/243	12/18	Pattern of conferences	Consensus													
		Pattern of conferences - section I	131	1	17	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y
40/246A	12/18	Financing of the U.N. Interim forces in Lebanon	124	15	4	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/246B	12/18	Idem	122	14	7	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/247	12/18	Review of the rates of reimbursement to the governments of troop-contributing states	120	14	7	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/248	12/18	Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the U.N.	109	15	27	DV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N
40/252	12/18	Questions to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1986-1987	Consensus													
		Section IV	135	2	11	DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y

RES	DATE	CONTENTS	VOTE IN PLENARY	VOTE	B	D	F	G	F	I	I	L	N	U	P	S
	1986		Yes	No	Ab	EC										
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE																
40/253		Programme budget for the biennium 1986-1987:														
40/253A	12/18	Budget appropriations for 1986-87	127	10	11	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A
40/253B	12/18	Income estimates for 1986-87	137	10	0	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/253C	12/18	Financing of appropriations for 1986	126	11	13	DV	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A
40/254	12/18	Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for 1986-87	139	8	0	CV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40/255	12/18	Working Capital Fund for 1986-87	124	11	13	DV	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N
40/257	12/18	Emoluments, pension scheme and conditions of service for the members of the International Court of Justices	121	11	15	DV	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	N	A	N
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE																
40/67	12/11	Development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order	125	0	19	DV	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A
40/69	12/11	Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind	127	6	9	DV	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	A	N	A
40/70	12/11	Report on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations	119	14	12	DV	N	N	A	Y	N	A	N	N	N	A

APPENDIX B

DIVIDED VOTES OF THE TWELVE IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Minority Votes, of one two, three, four or five Member States; three-way split votes and diametrical opposed votes cast in the 40th G.A. Plenary

ISOLATED MINORITY (15x1)			
RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/19	Return of cultural property to the countries of their origin	Plenary	Greece
40/62	Question of the Comoran Island of Mayotte	Plenary	France
40/64A	Comprehensive Sanctions against South Africa	Plenary	Greece
40/64D	Public information and action against Apartheid	Plenary	United Kingdom
40/96D Par. 8 preamble	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece
40/79	Implementation of resolution 39/51 (Treaty of Tlatelcoco)	1st Com.	France
40/81 Par. 5	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban	1st Com.	France
40/93	Israeli nuclear armament	1st Com.	Greece
40/93 Par. 4	Israeli nuclear armament	1st Com.	Greece
40/93 Par. 5	Israeli nuclear armament	1st Com.	Greece
40/94N	Disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security	1st Com.	France

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/151A	Disarmament and international security	1st Com.	Greece
40/173	International economic security	2nd Com.	Greece
40/112	Human rights and scientific and technological developments	3rd Com.	Greece
40/248	Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the U.N.	5th Com.	Spain
MINORITY OF TWO (21x2)			
40/63	Law of the Sea	Plenary	F.R. of Germany United Kingdom
40/96A	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/96B	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/96C	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/96D Par. 4 preamble	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/96D Par. 2	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/96D Par. 5	Question of Palestine	Plenary	Greece Spain
40/81 Par. 4	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test treaty	1st Com.	United Kingdom France
40/85	Convention on the security of non-nuclear-states	1st Com.	Ireland Greece
40/87 Par. 5	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	1st Com.	Greece Ireland
40/94I	Limitation and reduction of naval armaments	1st Com.	Greece Ireland

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/94H	Nuclear-weapon freeze	1st Com.	Greece Ireland
40/94M	Third Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	1st Com.	France Spain
40/151F	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	1st Com.	Greece Ireland
40/152A	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	1st Com.	Greece Ireland
40/152I	International co-operation for disarmament	1st Com.	Greece Ireland
40/161D	Israeli practices in the occupied territories	SPC	Greece Spain
40/161G	Israeli practices in the occupied territories	SPC	Greece Spain
40/185	Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries	2nd Com.	Greece Spain
40/50	Question of the Western Sahara	4th Com.	Greece Spain
40/51	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories	4th Com.	France United Kingdom
40/255	Working Capital Fund for 1986-87	5th Com.	Denmark Spain

MINORITY OF THREE (19x3)

40/64B	Relations between Israel and South Africa	Plenary	Greece Portugal Spain
40/97C	Programme of work of the U.N. Council for Namibia	Plenary	F.R. of Germany France United Kingdom

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/97E	U.N. Fund for Namibia	Plenary	F.R. of Germany France United Kingdom
40/97F	Special session of the G.A. on the question of Namibia	Plenary	F.R. of Germany France United Kingdom
40/89A	Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa	1st Com.	Belgium France United Kingdom
40/92A	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	1st Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland
40/161D Par. 6	Israeli practices in the occupied territories	SPC	Greece Portugal Spain
40/161E Par. 1	Israeli practices in the occupied territories	SPC	Greece Portugal Spain
40/165G	Population and refugees displaced since 1967	SPC	Greece Portugal Spain
40/165H	Protection of Palestine refugees	SPC	Greece Portugal Spain
40/165I Par. 7 preamble	Protection of Palestine refugees	SPC	Greece Portugal Spain
40/207	Long-term trends in economic development	1st Com.	Greece Ireland Netherlands
40/27 Par. 5	Convention on the Supression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	3rd Com.	Denmark Greece Spain

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/27 Par. 8	Idem	3rd Com.	Denmark Greece Spain
40/243	Pattern of conferences - section I	5th Com.	Greece Ireland Spain
40/253A	Budget appropriations for 1986-87	5th Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland
40/253C	Financing of appropriations for 1986	5th Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland
40/67	Development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order	6th Com.	Greece Ireland Netherlands

MINORITY OF FOUR (13x4)

40/56	25th anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries	Plenary	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
40/18	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	1st Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
40/83	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	1st Com.	Denmark France Italy United Kingdom
40/87 Par. 9	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	1st Com..	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/188	Trade Embargo against Nicaragua	2nd Com.	Denmark Greece France Spain
40/200	International co-operation in the field of the environment	2nd Com.	F.R. of Germany France United Kingdom Portugal
40/25	Universal realization of the right to self determination	3rd Com.	Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
40/27 Par. 3 preamble	Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	3rd Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
40/28	Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	3rd Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
40/28 Par. 4	Idem	3rd Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
40/114	Indivisibility and interdependence of economic social, cultural, civil and political rights	3rd Com.	Greece Ireland Netherlands Spain
40/114 Par. 8 preamble	Idem	3rd Com.	F.R. of Germany France Italy Netherlands

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/52	Activities of foreign economic and other interests	4th Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Spain
MINORITY OF FIVE (5x5)			
40/151B	World Disarmament Campaign	1st Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
40/152G	Climatic effects of nuclear war	1st Com.	Denmark Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
40/164B	Questions relating to information	SPC	Greece France Ireland Italy Spain
40/183 Par.1	Specific action relted to the particular needss and problems of land-locked developing countries	2nd Com.	France Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
40/114 Par. 11 preamble	Indivisibility and interdependence of economic social, cultural, civil and political rights	3rd Com.	F.R. of Germany France Italy Netherlands United Kingdom

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
THREE-WAY SPLIT VOTE			
40/21	Question of the Falkland Islands	Plenary	N: United Kingdom Y: Greece France Italy Spain A: the others
	The two British amendments	Plenary	N: Spain A: Greece France Italy Netherlands Y: the others
40/57	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and people	Plenary	N: United Kingdom A: Belgium F.R. of Germany France Italy Luxemburg Y: the others
40/58	Dissemination of information on decolonization	Plenary	N: United Kingdom A: Belgium F.R. of Germany France Italy Luxemburg Y: the others
40/64B	Situation in South Africa and assistance to the liberation movements	Plenary	Y: Greece A: Denmark Ireland Netherlands Spain N: the others
40/64C	World Conference on Sanctions	Plenary	Y: Denmark Greece

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
			Ireland A: France Luxemburg Netherlands Spain N: the others
40/64F	Programme of work of Special Committee against Apartheid	Plenary	N: United Kingdom Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: the others
40/64I	Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid	Plenary	N: United Kingdom A: F.R. of Germany Y: the others
40/168A	The situation in the Middle East	Plenary	Y: Greece A: Spain N: the others
40/168B	The situation in the Middle East	Plenary	Y: Greece A: Spain N: the others
40/80A	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland N: France United Kingdom A: the others
40/80B	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	1st Com.	Y: Greece N: France United Kingdom A: the others
40/31	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test- ban treaty	1st Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland Netherlands Spain N: France

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
			United Kingdom A: the others
40/88	Implementation of resolution 39/60	1st Com.	Y: Greece N: France United Kingdom A: the others
40/89B	Nuclear capability of South Africa	1st Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland Spain N: France United Kingdom A: the others
40/94G	Prohibition of fissionable material for weapons	1st Com.	N: France A: United Kingdom Y: the others
40/151C	Nuclear-arms freeze	1st Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: F.R. of Germany Luxemburg Netherlands Spain N: the others
40/151B	Freeze on nuclear weapons	1st Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: Spain N: the others
40/152C	Nuclear-weapons in all aspects	1st Com.	Y: Greece Luxemburg A: Ireland N: the others
40/152M	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
			N: France A: the others
40/152N	Recommendations of the 10th special session	1st Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: Italy Spain N: the others
40/152P	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland A: Denmark Spain N: the others
40/152Q	Prevention of nuclear war	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland N: France United Kingdom A: the others
40/159	Implementation of the collective security provisions of the U.N. Charter	1st Com.	Y: Greece A: Denmark Ireland Spain N: the others
40/165F	Resumption of the distribution to Palestine refugees (UNRWA)	SPC	Y: Greece A: Spain N: the others
40/200 Par. 7 preamble	International co-operation in the field of the environment	2nd Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland Netherlands A: Italy Luxemburg Spain N: the others

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/111	Human rights and use of scientific and technological developments	3rd Com.	Y: Greece A: Denmark Ireland Luxemburg Spain N: the others
40/53	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples by the specialized U.N. agencies	4th Com.	Y: Greece N: United Kingdom A: the others
40/239A	Final budget appropriations for 1984-85	5th Com.	N: United Kingdom Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: the others
40/252	Questions to the proposed programme budget for 1986-87	5th Com.	N: United Kingdom A: France Italy Y: the others
40/255	Working Capital Fund for 1986-87	5th Com.	Y: Denmark N: Spain A: the others
40/257 ABC	Emoluments, pension scheme and conditions of service for the members of the International Court of Justices	5th Com.	Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: Italy Netherlands Spain N: the others
40/69	Code of Offence against the Peace and Security of Mankind	6th Com.	N: France United Kingdom Y: Denmark Greece Ireland A: the others

RESOLUTION	OBJECT	ON THE REPORT OF	MINORITY
40/70	Report on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations	6th Com.	Y: Greece A: F.R. of Germany Ireland Spain N: the others

VOTES DIAMETRICAL OPPOSED
(without three-way split votes)

40/93 Par. 4	Israeli nuclear armament	1st Com.	Y: Greece N: the others
40/94H	Nuclear-weapon freeze	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland N: the others
40/152A	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	1st Com.	Y: Greece Ireland N: the others

APPENDIX C

COMMON STATEMENTS BY THE TWELVE IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Common declarations (cd), common declarations
on resolutions (dr) and explication of common
votes (ecv) accolated by agenda items at the 40th G.A.

P L E N A R Y M E E T I N G S (14 cd, 2 ecv, 6 dr)

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
24 September	cd	9	General Debate Jacques Poos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg on behalf of the European Community and its Member States.
23 October	cd	39	Commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the U.N. Jacques Santer, President of the government of Luxemburg, on behalf of the European Community and its Member States.
25 October	ecv	26	Co-operation between the U.N. and the League of Arab States.
28 October	cd	35	Policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa.
4 November	cd	22	The situation in Kampuchea.
1 November	cd	29	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations.
7 November	cd	30	Critical economic situation in Africa.
8 November	cd	14	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
11 November	cd	28	The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.
13 November	cds	48	International Youth Year.

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
21 November	cd	25	Co-operation between the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity.
22 November	cd	21	The situation in Central America.
3 December	cd	33	Question of Palestine.
5 December	cd	38	The situation in the Middle East.
10 December	dr	35	Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa.
12 December	dr	33	Question of Palestine.
13 December	dr	34	Question of Namibia.
16 December	dr	38	The situation in the Middle East.
17 December	ecv	84	Development and international economic co-operation.
17 December	dr	84c	Idem
17 December	dr	84c	Idea

F I R S T C O M M I T T E E (7 cd, 1 ecv)

17 October	cd		General Debate.
1 November	cd	69	Relationship between disarmament and development.
5 November	cd	63	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.
5 November	cd	61d	Consideration of guidelines for confidence building measures.
7 November	cd	61b 68b,d,e	General and complete disarmament.
14 November	cd	62	Reduction of military budgets.

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
18 November	ecv	60	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
2 December	cd	72	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the strengthening of International Security.

S P E C I A L P O L I T I C A L C O M M I T T E E (7 cd, 2 ecv)

4 October	cd	74	Effects of atomic radiation.
9 October	cd	77	Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.
11 October	cd	80	International co-operation to avert new flows of refugees.
30 October	cd	75	Report of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.
7 November	cd	79	Committee for Palestinian refugees.
13 November	cd	78	Questions relating to information.
21 November	cd	76	International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.
15 November	ecv	79	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA).
6 December	ecv	78	Questions relating to information.

S E C O N D C O M M I T T E E (4 cd, 4 ecv)

3 October	cd		General Debate.
23 October	cd	84	Development and international economic co-operation.
30 October	cd	12	Report of the Economic and Social Council.

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
6 November	cd	84	Development and international economic co-operation. (second part).
11 November	ecv	12o	Economic projects of development in the occupied Palestinian territories.
11 November	ecv	12p	Assistance to the Palestinian people.
11 November	ecv	84g	Condition of Palestinian people in the occupied territories.
25 November	ecv	12a	International economic security.
T H I R D C O M M I T T E E (4 cd, 3 ecv, 1 dr)			
7 October	cd	88	Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second Decade to combat racism and racial discrimination.
28 October	cd	92	World conference to review and appraise the achievements of the U.N. Decade for women: equality, development and peace.
4 November	ecv	94c	Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
4 November	ecv	93	Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the guarantee and observance of human rights.
11 November	cd	105	Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
19 November	dr	94	Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
26 November	cd	12	Report of the Economic and Social Council.
27 November	ecv	90	World social situation.

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
F O U R T H C O M M I T T E E (1 dr)			
29 October	dr	110	Activities which are impeding the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other territories under colonial domination.
F I F T H C O M M I T T E E (11 cd, 3 dr)			
30 September	cd	114	Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors.
15 October	dr	114	Idem
25 October	cd	116	Proposed programme budget for 1986-1987.
		117	Programme planning.
1 November	cd	117	Programme planning.
26 November	cd	118	Financial emergency of the U.N.
11 December	cd	119	Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the U.N. with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
25 November	cd	120	Joint Inspection Unit.
17 October	cd	121	Pattern of conferences.
1 November	dr	121	Pattern of conferences.
9 October	cd	122	Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the U.N.
17 December	dr	122	Idem, Report of the committee on contributions.
9 December	cd	123	Personnel questions.
15 November	cd	124	United Nations common system.

DATE 1985	STATEMENT	A G E N D A I T E M S A N D S U B J E C T	
		125	United Nations pension system.
	cd	124	United Nations common system.
S I X T H C O M M I T T E E (5 cd, 3 ecv, 1 motion of procedure)			
2 October	cd	136	Protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.
16 October	cd	137	Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the drafting of an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries.
24 October	cd	129	Measures to prevent international terrorism and study of the causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence.
22 November	cd	130	Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order.
27 November	ecv	137	Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the drafting of an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries.
27 November	ecv	127	Consideration of the draft articles on most favoured nation clauses.
2 December	cd	131	Development and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between states.
3 December	ecv	131	Idem
2 December	mp	141	Report of the Committee on the Charter of the U.N.

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